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*
 
This Article treats the order of decision on multiple issues in a single 
case. That order can be very important, with a lot at stake for the court, 
society, and parties. Generally speaking, although the parties can control 
which issues they put before a judge, the judge gets to choose the 
decisional sequence in light of those various interests. 
The law sees fit to put few limits on the judge‘s power to sequence. The 
few limits are, in fact, quite narrow in application, and even narrower if 
properly understood. The Steel Co.-Ruhrgas rule generally requires a 
federal court to decide Article III justiciability and subject-matter 
jurisdiction before ruling on the merits. The Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen 
rule requires a federal trial judge to avoid preclusion by first giving to the 
jury a factual issue common to the merits of both law and equity claims for 
relief joined in the same case. The impact of these two narrow limits might 
seem mundane, but much turns on their scope. The sequence of 
jurisdictional defenses can result in dismissing a claim when the court 
lacked authority to hear the case and may lock a litigant out of both federal 
and state courts. And, while a jury‘s decision on damages would restrain a 
judge‘s decision on final injunctive relief, the judge remains free to decide 
jurisdictional defenses, class certification, or evidentiary issues without 
worry of affecting the jury‘s later consideration of common issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
―The evidence and arguments a district court considers in the class 
certification decision call for rigorous analysis,‖ warned the appellate court 
in the celebrated class action called In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litigation.
1
 For certification, the court explained, the class representative 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the case satisfies the 
requirements for class treatment.
2
 ―An overlap between a class certification 
requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve 
relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class certification 
requirement is met.‖3  
                                                                                                                     
 1. 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008) (involving antitrust conspiracy action brought by 
purchasers of hydrogen peroxide and related chemical products against chemical manufacturers); 
see Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation: Class Certification, NAT‘L L.J., Jan. 26, 2009, at 9, 9 
(describing Hydrogen Peroxide as potentially ―the most influential decision relating to class 
certification‖ of the decade). 
 2. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307. 
 3. Id. at 316. The quoted views conform to today‘s usual approach to preclusion. See infra 
notes 191–92 and accompanying text. It is the ever more important approach as more courts are 
getting into the merits to screen out class actions at the certification stage. But whether to get into 
the merits at the certification phase remains controversial. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss2/1
2011] SEQUENCING THE ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 303 
 
In other words, after electing to pose a difficult threshold question, the 
legal system advises the trial court just to plow ahead by deciding that 
difficult question, even though the judge will encounter during a trial on 
the merits the same issue under the same formulation and the same 
standard of proof. To alleviate any discomfort generated by such a view, 
the Third Circuit resorted to unsupported pronouncement, perhaps without 
the requisite ―rigorous analysis,‖ in mustering this dictum: ―Although the 
district court‘s findings for the purpose of class certification are conclusive 
on that topic, they do not bind the fact-finder on the merits.‖4 Where did 
the court get that idea? When is a judge really free to decide the order of 
decision without worry of untoward preclusion or jury displacement? 
I.  DECISIONAL SEQUENCING 
In deciding a case, a court must confront a series of issues that may be 
sequenced in numerous ways. Deciding the order of decision is among the 
law‘s most basic decisions. Who decides the order of decision? Although 
parties generally control the issues put before a judge, the judge generally 
decides the sequence of decisions.
5
 
Of course, I am talking here of formal legal reasoning, not intuitive 
decisionmaking. One common situation, useful for exploring the 
sequencing decision, is where a court faces alternative grounds for 
disposition, that is, an array of open routes to disposing of the claim, one 
way or the other. The best example is where a defendant has raised a 
number of defenses so that the court might decide in favor of the defendant 
because of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, the plaintiff‘s failure to 
state a claim, or the defendant‘s affirmative defense. As a result of the 
chosen sequence, the court reaches some issues and fails to reach other 
issues. Among much else, the amount of effort by the court, the kind of law 
made, and the parties‘ discovery needs all turn on the sequence of decision. 
The law could impose a sequencing rule that dictates the order in which the 
                                                                                                                     
Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub 
nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011); Steig D. Olson, “Chipping 
Away”: The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification 
Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 935–36 (2009); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers 
for Class Certification, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 149, 149–50 (2010), http://www.vanderbiltlaw  
review.org/content/articles/2010/11/Nagareda-Common-Answers-for-Class-Certification-63-Vand.-
L.-Rev.-En-Banc-149-2010.pdf (discussing the Wal-Mart class action).  
 4. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318. The ―rigorous analysis‖ requirement comes 
from General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (interpreting the 
requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)). 
 5. See Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing 20 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law, Working 
Paper No. 10-004, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572709 (providing a general 
treatment of sequencing and the interests at stake, in an article considering only the alternative-
grounds-of-dismissal scenario but widening the focus to include sequencing between trial and 
appellate courts and between courts in different jurisdictions). 
3
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court must decide the defenses, or the law could leave it to the judge‘s 
discretion. 
This example of alternative grounds of dismissal gives a useful sense of 
what a sequencing rule is: a binding direction that the court face this issue 
before that issue. However, my interest is more general than that example. 
The order in which the court confronts nondispositive issues also matters. 
The sequence of these issues affects the course of a case‘s progress. Parties 
should care because an early victory on a certain issue, or even the 
threatened intrusiveness of early attention to a certain issue, can shift 
parties‘ settlement leverage dramatically. Moreover, parties‘ stakes will 
increase to the extent that deciding an issue now might foreclose the same 
issue arising later in the case. That latter concern prompted the dictum in 
the Hydrogen Peroxide case, in which the appellate court assured readers 
that the judge‘s class certification decision would not bind a jury on 
common issues intertwined in the merits. Therefore, because the decisional 
sequence can always have effects, the law in any setting could conceivably 
dictate a sequencing rule. 
A.  Discretion 
A judge in fact has a lot of freedom to sequence issues. In the wide 
realm of freedom that judges enjoy in deciding the order of decision, what 
factors guide them? As suggested by the pioneering work of Professor 
Peter Rutledge, three general categories of factors predominate.
6
 
First, judicial economy plays a major role. A court‘s freedom to pick 
and choose which issue to address first will affect the total amount of effort 
required. Most notably, among alternative grounds for disposition, 
proceeding immediately to the easiest and surest ground that ends a case 
tends to lessen the judicial workload. A court could thereby avoid shaky 
decisions on difficult issues. Ease of disposition reflects a variety of 
considerations that go beyond a limited need for research and deliberation, 
including the ease of evaluating objective matters rather than subjective 
matters. Sureness of disposition pays the various premiums of clarity of 
outcome in the trial court and minimization of costs on appeal. 
In the sequencing of nondispositive issues, choosing a certain path also 
might decrease judicial effort. Awareness that most cases end in settlement 
might counsel a particular sequence of least effort. Even legal logic (such 
as liability should come before remedy, or elements of the claim come 
before affirmative defenses) or pure logic (deductive logic prompts a 
certain order, or reflective equilibrium imposes an iterative readjustment of 
conclusions) might suggest a path of decision that reduces mental effort. 
Additionally, there is often a practicality in following a certain order 
(preliminary relief comes before final relief, or factual issues need to be 
tried toward the end), but these are not strictly binding rules of sequencing. 
Also, more toward the substantive side of things, the law might provide an 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See id. at 19–27. 
4
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―if-then‖ relationship that appears to dictate a sequence. That is, the law 
might say that some issue needs to be decided affirmatively before a 
desirable procedure or remedy can be followed or pursued (although such 
prerequisites are not as common as one would suppose). The best example 
is the rule that the plaintiff must show an inadequate remedy at law in 
order to make an equitable remedy available.
7
 But really these 
propositions, too, are matters of practicality rather than mandated 
sequencing. The proof lies in thinking of these propositions in the 
alternative-grounds-of-dismissal scenario: the court can then sequence as it 
wishes, so that the court could first decide that no equitable remedy exists 
and hence avoid deciding inadequacy of the legal remedy. Even when 
applying these propositions to nondispositive issues, the court could 
actually decide in any order it wishes, even though it is usually more 
economic to decide the ―if‖ before the ―then.‖ 
Second, other institutional factors may suggest a certain sequence. A 
trial judge may very well choose to foster institutional interests by adopting 
a certain sequence; for example, the judge might take into account that the 
sequence will affect the output of precedent and thus the development of 
the law. There are also prudential doctrines, like the passive virtue of 
avoiding constitutional issues
8
 or considerations of judicial restraint and 
federalism that counsel avoiding certain issues when possible. These 
factors, too, are not strictly binding rules of sequencing (even if 
hierarchically announced), but instead, they act as a way of informing trial 
courts‘ discretion by identifying particularly weighty factors. Moreover, 
there are certain issues marked as threshold issues, like class certification,
9
 
that require early attention as a gatekeeping mechanism. But these are more 
timing guidelines than sequencing rules. 
Third, the sequence can affect the substantive goals of law. Sequencing 
will impact parties‘ interests in outcome. It may affect parties‘ litigation 
behavior, such as in choosing which issues to raise in the hope of 
constraining a judge‘s sequencing. Even more clearly, it may affect parties‘ 
                                                                                                                     
 7. See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§ 22, 43 (2d ed. 
1948). 
 8. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847 
(2005) (lamenting the many exceptions to that presumption); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law 
and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 425 
(2007). Compare Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (discussing the Supreme Court‘s avoidance of constitutional 
adjudication on the merits), with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A 
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1964) 
(criticizing Bickel‘s thesis as ―vulnerable and dangerous‖). 
 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (―At an early practicable time after a person sues or is 
sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a 
class action.‖); 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785.3, at 453 (3d ed. 2005) (―The time at which the court finds it 
appropriate to make its class-action determination may vary with the circumstances of the particular 
case.‖). 
5
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settlement leverage; for example, a defendant may be disadvantaged when 
a court skips over some jurisdictional issues to allow a plaintiff to pursue 
discovery and a decision on the merits.
10
 A trial judge may take the 
appropriate aims of law into account in setting a sequence, although 
presumably maintenance of neutrality between the parties should be the 
judge‘s strongest motive here. 
Even with so much at stake in the sequencing decision, lawmakers 
usually choose not to impose mandatory sequencing rules on judges. This 
Article will try to delineate the wide extent of judges‘ freedom to sequence. 
B.  Rules 
The suggestive discussion above of the factors relevant to sequencing 
shows the picture to be so complicatingly multifactored that, 
presumptively, lawmakers should stay out and leave it to judicial 
discretion. However, given the reasonable assumption that judges tend to 
act in their self-interest, judges may too heavily weigh the first factor of 
minimizing workload.
11
 Thus, lawmakers may need to resort to regulation 
to protect the other public and private interests at stake, at least when 
neglect of those interests would come at an especially high cost. But still, 
intervention should be the exception. 
Conforming to that conservative view on the normative question, the 
descriptive fact is that on the civil side, there are remarkably few external 
limitations on a trial judge‘s freedom to sequence. The legislative branch 
has been wholly inactive. Perhaps interest groups have formulated 
insufficient concern over the subtleties of sequencing and so have exerted 
no pressure. The judiciary has intervened seldom. Perhaps institutional 
worries are usually too small to generate higher courts‘ concern over trial 
judges‘ sequencing performance. 
In current law, only two sequencing rules are of significance, given the 
above-described narrow definition of what constitutes such a rule. Both 
rules derive from judicial interpretations of the Constitution, and they are 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See Rutledge, supra note 5, at 27. Rutledge explains: 
Flexible sequencing rules strengthen a defendant‘s position in settlement because 
the defendant has more avenues available to it for immediate dismissal with a 
lower risk of an adverse ruling. By contrast, rigid sequencing rules strengthen a 
plaintiff‘s position in settlement because the mandatory sequence enables the 
plaintiff to obtain a favorable ruling on an early issue and, depending on the 
availability of jurisdictional discovery, drive up the defendant‘s costs early in the 
dispute. 
Id. 
 11. See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 627 (1994) (arguing that judicial response to various legal rules is often the 
result of judges‘ self-interest); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The 
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39 (1993) (stating as plausible that 
―judicial effort has a diminishing effect on the satisfactions from judicial voting‖). 
6
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heavily dependent on concerns linked to federal courts. Interestingly, both 
rules embroil the commentator so quickly and thoroughly in matters of res 
judicata that these sequencing rules will remain ever mysterious without 
careful attention to preclusion. The first of the rules arises from the 
scenario of alternative grounds for disposition that the defendant chose to 
put before the court, while the second involves the more general scenario 
of multiple issues. 
Part II of the Article addresses the first rule, which treats which 
jurisdictional defenses a court must decide first. Although a seemingly 
mundane matter, this sequence can result in dismissing a claim when the 
court lacked authority to hear the case and maybe in locking a litigant out 
of both federal and state courts. The Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment
12
 and Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.
13
 line of cases tried to 
introduce control by requiring that a federal court decide a challenge to its 
jurisdiction over the case before dismissing on the merits. But as this 
Article will explain, this rule boils down to a fairly modest constraint 
because it has a big limitation: the court still may pick among jurisdictional 
and other threshold defenses, with a dismissal on any one of them enjoying 
some preclusive effect. 
Part III of the Article addresses the other sequencing rule, derived from 
the Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover
14
 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood
15
 
cases. It dictates that when a common factual issue will come before both 
judge and jury within the same federal case, the jury must decide it first to 
avoid the preclusive effect of a judicial decision subverting the 
constitutional jury right. But as this Article will also explain, this rule is 
very narrow too: it applies only to trial of factual issues common to the 
merits of both law and equity claims for relief joined in the same case. 
Thus, while a jury‘s decision on damages would restrain a judge‘s decision 
on final injunctive relief, the judge remains free to decide jurisdictional 
defenses, class certification, or evidentiary issues without fear of affecting 
the jury‘s later consideration of common issues.  
C.  Fog 
Although lawmakers impose little constraint on judges‘ freedom to 
sequence, the prevailing lack of clarity about the existence and scope of the 
sequencing rules works to constrain judges more broadly. A court might be 
unsure of when it can skip over jurisdiction, or concerned that an early 
decision will preclude its subsequent decision of overlapping matters. 
Consider, for example, this district court‘s concerned musings about 
deciding a typical issue of personal jurisdiction that involved issues in 
                                                                                                                     
 12. 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). 
 13. 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999). 
 14. 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959) (citing Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109–10 (1891)). 
 15. 369 U.S. 469, 472–73 (1962) (citing Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510–11). 
7
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common with the merits: 
If the [threshold-decision] course were undertaken, the court 
might be deciding key fact issues that, if the doctrine of 
estoppel were not applied, would be resubmitted for jury 
determination at trial, thus making wasteful use of scarce 
judicial resources and also creating a possibility of 
inconsistent findings by the court on motion and the jury at 
trial. If estoppel were applied on the basis of the court‘s 
resolution of the issues, thereby precluding waste and 
inconsistency, then either the court must impanel a jury just to 
try those issues for disposition of the motion—a dubious 
procedure at best—or else the parties would effectively be 
denied jury trial on those issues because the court‘s findings 
on them when determining the motion would preclude their 
resubmission at jury trial.
16
 
This reasoning is seriously flawed, as this Article will demonstrate. To 
the extent that such confusion creates a broader constraint than lawmakers 
intended, the constraint is undesirable. Hence, bringing clarity to the rules 
of sequencing should be beneficial and so is another aim of this Article. 
II.  JURISDICTIONAL PRIMACY 
Our law‘s foremost sequencing rule says that a federal court‘s decision 
on a challenge to its jurisdiction must come before decision on the merits.
17
 
To understand that rule, which, as already mentioned, stems from the Steel 
Co.
18
 and Ruhrgas
19
 cases, one must first draw the subtle distinction 
between ―nonbypassability‖ and ―resequencing.‖20 
Nonbypassability, or the requirement to decide first things first, rests 
mainly on the Steel Co. case.
21
 A court cannot skip over a challenge to 
subject-matter jurisdiction in order to dismiss on the merits, even though 
finding a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction would likewise have produced 
                                                                                                                     
 16. N. Am. Video Corp. v. Leon, 480 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Mass. 1979); see also Kevin M. 
Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 978–80, 988 (2006) (calming this 
particular worry by establishing that the standard of proof for jurisdiction is less demanding than the 
standard applicable to the merits). 
 17. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER‘S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1411–17 (6th ed. 
2009). On application of this doctrine to appellate courts, see Joan Steinman, After Steel Co.: 
“Hypothetical Jurisdiction” in the Federal Appellate Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 855, 857 
(2001). 
 18. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998). 
 19. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583–85 (1999) (citing Steel Co., 523 
U.S. at 101–02).  
 20. See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal 
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 92–94 (2001) (providing the best treatment of this doctrine). 
 23. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101; see also Idleman, supra note 20, at 92. 
8
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a victory for the defendant. So, when a defense is ―nonbypassable,‖ this 
Article means that a court cannot skip over it and instead dismiss on the 
merits. The sequencing rule is subject-matter jurisdiction first. 
 Resequencing, which received its blessing in Ruhrgas, mitigates this 
sequencing rule. It allows courts to avoid decision on subject-matter 
jurisdiction by hypothesizing its existence in order to dismiss on other 
threshold grounds with a binding effect, which could preclude that 
threshold issue.
22
 A court can skip over challenged subject-matter 
jurisdiction to dismiss for, say, lack of personal jurisdiction.
23
 So, when 
this Article refers to a defense as ―resequenceable,‖ it means that a court 
can choose to dismiss on that defense without first facing a nonbypassable 
defense such as subject-matter jurisdiction. 
A. Nonbypassability, or Deciding First Things First 
Nonbypassability has obvious sequencing implications for judicial 
decisionmaking. A court must decide in a certain order if a 
nonbypassability rule is in place. To the extent that a court is uncertain 
about the reach of the rule, but wishes to avoid reversal, it will follow the 
rule even when the rule does not apply. Thus, some attention to the rule‘s 
precise meaning is in order. 
1.  Rule 
Drawing on a long line of precedent,
24
 the Steel Co. Court held that a 
lower federal court could not dismiss for failure to state a claim without 
first deciding a challenge to Article III standing,
25
 which the Supreme 
Court determined was lacking in the case but which posed a harder 
question to resolve.
26
 Even though the result was the same—judgment for 
the defendant—a federal court could not give a judgment on the merits 
without first ascertaining that it had jurisdiction. 
The Court rested its decision on separation of powers and the Article III 
requirement of a ―[c]ase‖ or ―[c]ontrovers[y].‖27 In order for a court to stay 
within its proper limits, it cannot go about rendering a decision on the 
merits without making sure that the case falls within the court‘s 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 94. 
 23. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583, 588.   
 24. Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 93–100 (1998) (citing historical cases, including Capron v. Van 
Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804) (allowing the plaintiff to raise original subject-matter 
jurisdiction on appeal)). 
 25. See generally 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 9–16 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing requirements for 
Article III standing and a court‘s powers when requirements are not met). 
 26. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93–102, 109–10. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102. 
9
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jurisdictional bounds.
28
 Based on the Court‘s reasoning and wording, by 
―jurisdiction,‖ the Court meant Article III justiciability29 as well as 
ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction.
30
 The Court has never added to that 
short list of nonbypassable defenses. 
2.  Exception 
Steel Co. represented the high-water mark for the nonbypassability 
doctrine; however, the Court‘s opinion was far from definitive on whether 
jurisdiction must be decided before everything else. The majority admitted 
that precedent had ―diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III 
jurisdiction is always an antecedent question.‖31 The separate opinions of 
six of the Justices went further in underlining that qualification.
32
 
The Court has since cut back on Steel Co.‘s seeming thrust, first by 
drawing a line between nonmerits and merits, then by ruling that a federal 
court can dismiss on nonmerits grounds without reaching Article III 
justiciability or subject-matter jurisdiction.
33
 In the fountainhead case of 
Ruhrgas, a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg one 
year after Steel Co., the Court held that a court may resequence nonmerits 
defenses so that the court can face a personal jurisdiction defense before 
deciding a subject-matter jurisdiction defense.
34
 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101. 
 29. See generally 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 3529 (discussing the concept of 
justiciability and the limits on judicial power created by Article III). 
 30. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101–02 (referring to the ―statutory and (especially) 
constitutional elements of jurisdiction,‖ the Court ruled, ―For a court to pronounce upon the 
[merits] when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.‖). 
 31. Id. at 101; see infra note 118 (collecting cases). 
 32. For a summary of the concurring opinion of Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor, the opinion of 
Justice Stephen Breyer concurring in part and in the judgment, and the opinions of Justices John 
Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurring in the judgment, see Jack H. Friedenthal, The 
Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 265–66 (2000).   
Justices [William] Rehnquist and [Clarence] Thomas join the more traditional 
view espoused by Justice [Antonin] Scalia and denounce ―hypothetical 
jurisdiction‖ but do not completely shut the door . . . . Justice Breyer clearly 
approves of ―hypothetical jurisdiction‖ in some circumstances and both Justices 
O‘Connor and [Anthony] Kennedy leave open the question of if and when 
―hypothetical jurisdiction‖ should be permitted, but indicate that the doctrine has 
some validity. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice [David] Souter concurred, at the 
very least leaves open the question of ―hypothetical jurisdiction‖  or approves of 
it, depending upon which portion of the opinion one relies upon. Only Justice 
Ginsburg refused to be drawn into the discussion, and it was she who wrote the 
unanimous opinion in Ruhrgas. 
Id. 
 33. See infra note 120 (collecting cases). 
 34. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583–88 (1999) (treating personal 
jurisdiction as resequenceable). 
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As discussed below,
35
 one might argue that the list of nonmerits 
defenses eligible for resequencing remains especially unclear. 
Nevertheless, it is absolutely clear that this list of resequenceable threshold 
matters is not the same as, and is in fact much longer than, the list of 
fundamental matters that a federal court cannot bypass in favor of the 
merits. The Steel Co. case used the example of statutory standing
36
 as a 
resequenceable defense that could precede subject-matter jurisdiction, as 
well as a defense that the court could bypass in order to dismiss on the 
merits.
37
 But that is just one example. A court can also bypass prudential 
standing
38
 and a host of other resequenceable threshold issues.
39
 
3.  Nonbypassable Grounds 
So, more precisely, which defenses can a court not bypass in order to 
get to the merits? To appear on the list of nonbypassable defenses, a 
ground must involve a pretty basic matter in the nature of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. As the District of Columbia Circuit put it, ―‗a less than pure 
jurisdictional question, need not be decided before a merits question.‘‖40 
Again, most entries on the longer list of resequenceable threshold 
matters are bypassable. The prime, and largely determinative, question in 
relating the two lists is whether a court can bypass the resequenceable 
defense of personal jurisdiction.
41
 So, can a court pass over personal 
jurisdiction in order to dismiss on the merits? 
Although the cases decided before Steel Co. were split on this 
question,
42
 courts have since leaned more toward no.
43
 Most significantly, 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 116–47. 
 36. See generally 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 3531.13 (discussing examples of 
congressional enactments on standing). 
 37. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 n.2 (1998) (detailing expressly 
that a court can bypass a statutory standing question and go to the merits, but a court may 
resequence that statutory standing question before an Article III justiciability or subject-matter 
jurisdiction defense). 
 38. See generally 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 3531, at 9–16 (―[S]tanding may be 
denied if as a matter of judicial self-restraint it seems wise not to entertain the case.‖). 
 39. See, e.g., Idleman, supra note 20, at 93, 95–97. Compare In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 
192 F.3d 995, 1000–01 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding a court can bypass federal sovereign 
immunity for the merits), with Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (holding a court can resequence federal sovereign immunity). 
 40. In re Sealed Case, 192 F.3d at 1000 (quoting United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & 
Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).  
 41. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 95 (―The natural starting point for this task is with personal 
jurisdiction . . . .‖). 
 42. Id. at 95 & nn.524–25. 
 43. Compare Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 623 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (―A court 
must find jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, before determining the validity of a 
claim.‖), and United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir. 1999) (―The 
Supreme Court‘s recent exhortations to decide issues of jurisdiction—both personal and subject 
11
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the Supreme Court, in another unanimous opinion written by Justice 
Ginsburg, seems to have assumed no in its most recent decision in this line 
of cases, Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping 
Corp.
44
 
In that case, the district court held that it possessed admiralty subject-
matter jurisdiction, but it declined to decide personal jurisdiction and 
instead dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds; the court of appeals 
agreed on subject-matter jurisdiction, but it held that a court could not skip 
over personal jurisdiction.
45
 The Supreme Court reversed, allowing 
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds without decision on personal 
jurisdiction.
46
 But the course of decision had removed from the Court‘s 
holding anything regarding bypassability of personal jurisdiction: its 
holding is perfectly consistent with a view that either forum non 
conveniens or the merits can precede personal jurisdiction. Also, because 
the lower courts had decided that subject-matter jurisdiction existed, the 
Court clarified little about resequenceability: its stated view that forum non 
conveniens is resequenceable before subject-matter jurisdiction is dictum.
47
 
Indeed, the Court taught little besides the fact that this doctrine has become 
too complicated for the Court itself. It most pointedly proved this by 
declaring that Steel Co., which, in fact, did not involve or discuss personal 
jurisdiction, ―clarified that a federal court generally may not rule on the 
merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the 
category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties 
(personal jurisdiction).‖48 That erroneous dictum, implying that subject-
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are equivalents for the purpose 
of the nonbypassability doctrine, will surely influence lower courts in the 
future.
49
 
                                                                                                                     
matter—before reaching the merits of a case suggest to us that consideration of [the defendant‘s] 
summary judgment motion should await a determination of the district court‘s jurisdiction over [the 
defendant].‖), with Pace v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 
17, 1998) (per curiam) (―The district court was not required to resolve the issue of personal 
jurisdiction prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim . . . .‖), and United 
States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 80 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (bypassing service of process for the 
merits). 
 44. 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007); see Nathan Viavant, Recent Development, Sinochem 
International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.: The United States Supreme Court Puts 
Forum Non Conveniens First, 16 TUL. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 557, 571–73 (2008) (viewing 
sequencing for forum non conveniens to be now so unclear as to sow the seeds for the demise of the 
nonbypassability rule). 
 45. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 427–28. 
 46. Id. at 425. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 430–31. 
 49. See, e.g., Dan v. Douglas Cnty. Dep‘t of Corrs., No. 8:06CV714, 2009 WL 483837, at *3 
(D. Neb. Feb. 25, 2009) (quoting Sinochem that lack of personal jurisdiction prevents the court 
from ruling on the merits); Ashton v. Florala Mem‘l Hosp., No. 2:06cv226-ID, 2007 WL 1526837, 
at *1 & n.1 (M.D. Ala. May 24, 2007) (relying on Sinochem that the court must first decide the 
issue of personal jurisdiction). But see Di Loreto v. Costigan, 351 F. App‘x 747, 751 (3d Cir. 2009) 
12
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Nevertheless, I think a court can pass over personal jurisdiction in order 
to dismiss on the merits—in other words, personal jurisdiction is a 
resequenceable but bypassable defense. So, a court may consider personal 
jurisdiction without deciding subject-matter jurisdiction; alternatively, if it 
finds subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may bypass personal jurisdiction 
and dismiss on the merits. One reason is that Steel Co.‘s concerns of 
separation of powers and the requirement of a case or controversy do not 
extend to personal jurisdiction. Likewise, any concern of intruding on 
states‘ authority does not extend beyond subject-matter jurisdiction. The 
District of Columbia Circuit again provided a good explanation: ―The 
district court was not required to resolve the issue of personal jurisdiction 
prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because 
personal jurisdiction exists to protect the liberty interests of defendants, 
unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which serves as a limitation on judicial 
competence.‖50 
Moreover, the plaintiff cannot complain if the court accepts the 
assertion that personal jurisdiction exists. Meanwhile, the defendant has 
put multiple defenses before the court and so has consented somewhat to 
some sort of sequencing. In any event, a successful defendant has no real 
grounds for complaining about the initial court bypassing personal 
jurisdiction. A victory on the merits, with its broad res judicata effects, is 
worth more to the defendant than a jurisdictional dismissal.  
Yet, the truly key difference between Article III justiciability and 
subject-matter jurisdiction, on the one hand, and personal jurisdiction, on 
the other hand, is that a judgment that skips over the former might be a 
valid judgment under the doctrine of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction, 
as elaborated in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank.
51
 
That doctrine says that a judgment resting on assumed subject-matter 
jurisdiction can nonetheless stand safe from challenge. Notwithstanding all 
the slogans about subject-matter jurisdiction‘s fundamental importance, the 
offense to the systemic interests at stake is not great enough always to 
warrant relief from judgment—unlike the more individual interests 
wrapped up in the often constitutionally based intricacies of personal 
jurisdiction. A defendant who has not waived an undecided personal 
jurisdiction defense should be able to raise it to obtain relief from 
                                                                                                                     
(bypassing personal jurisdiction for the merits). 
 50. Pace v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 
1998) (per curiam) (distinguishing Steel Co.). 
 51. 308 U.S. 371, 376–78 (1940) (precluding a defaulted defendant from collateral attack on 
subject-matter jurisdiction grounds after other defendants had appeared and litigated the case 
without raising subject-matter jurisdiction and after the prior court had canceled the defendants‘ 
bonds); see infra text accompanying notes 65–75. A related assumed-jurisdiction mechanism, the 
one that forecloses attack on challenged but skipped subject-matter jurisdiction, entails the 
extension of hypothetical jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 98–115. 
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judgment.
52
 After a court bypasses personal jurisdiction and dismisses the 
case on other grounds, the defendant could get relief from the judgment if 
the defendant, who would be the only party entitled to raise the point, were 
ever to need such relief. 
Therein lies the key to understanding nonbypassability. The list of 
nonbypassable grounds should not turn solely on the relative importance of 
defenses, which would open fruitless debate on the stature of subject-
matter jurisdiction versus that of personal jurisdiction.
53
 The actual concern 
instead derives from the asymmetry between subject-matter jurisdiction 
and personal jurisdiction under the preclusion doctrine. Because unlitigated 
subject-matter jurisdiction can preclude,
54
 the fear arises that a court will 
bypass this prerequisite for adjudicating and give a dismissal on the merits 
that is later unassailable. To avoid that result, the Court declares the 
preclusive prerequisite to be nonbypassable.
55
 
It thus appears that when the law says a defense is ―nonbypassable,‖ it 
means that if a court nevertheless purposefully skips the defense in order to 
give dismissal on the merits, no brand of assumed jurisdiction will protect 
the judgment from attack. When the law says that a court ―cannot‖ bypass 
subject-matter jurisdiction, it means that if the court violates the rule, a 
person can get relief from the judgment upon showing a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, whether or not that person appealed the judgment. 
Although no relief from the judgment will lie simply for violation of the 
nonbypassability rule, because that would be mere error and not a void 
judgment, the judgment will fall if subject-matter jurisdiction was actually 
absent.
56
 
Therefore, the list of nonbypassable grounds should include only those 
requirements for a valid judgment that, if skipped over by the court, could 
otherwise be cut off as a ground for attack against the judgment. 
Accordingly, that list of nonbypassable prerequisites should include 
subject-matter jurisdiction but not territorial jurisdiction or notice. 
However, the authorities are lax in defining the precise scope of ―subject-
matter jurisdiction‖ as a requirement for validity.57 First, a lack of 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.4(C) (2d ed. 2009) 
(explaining that waiver equates to jurisdiction by consent but that a defaulting and therefore 
nonwaiving defendant can later challenge territorial jurisdiction or notice). 
 53. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 31–39. 
 54. Chicot, 308 U.S. at 377–78. 
 55. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998). 
 56. See CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 5.1(B)(1) (explaining the concept of validity). 
 57. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 & cmt. a (1982) (defining subject-
matter jurisdiction as the court‘s ―authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the 
action‖ and acknowledging that the authority may derive from constitutional or statutory 
provisions); Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 
YALE L.J. 164, 164 & n.1 (1977). 
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jurisdiction under Article III will result in relief from judgment,
58
 but the 
lesser aspects of justiciability will not.
59
 Second, courts need to keep 
jurisdiction and the merits separate for the purpose of validity, so that the 
attacker of the judgment cannot litigate the merits anew.
60
 
In sum, no significant reason exists to require a court to decide the 
existence of personal jurisdiction before deciding the merits in the 
defendant‘s favor. With personal jurisdiction taken off the 
nonbypassability list, and given an understanding of why the Court created 
that list, it becomes clearer that the Steel Co. line of cases places only 
Article III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction on the list of 
nonbypassable grounds. 
                                                                                                                     
 58. See, e.g., Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 939, 954–55 
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (―Because there was no case or controversy, this court lacked constitutional power 
to enter judgment against defendants.‖), rev’d on other grounds, 402 F.3d 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 59. See, e.g., Mendell ex rel. Viacom, Inc. v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731–32 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(―Plaintiff‘s acquisition of a note following an adverse ruling on his claim to standing as a 
shareholder did not present the kind of ‗extraordinary‘ circumstance that mandates relief to avoid an 
‗extreme and undue hardship.‘‖ (quoting Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1986))), 
aff’d on other grounds, 501 U.S. 115 (1991); Sarin v. Ochsner, 721 N.E.2d 932, 935 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2000) (―More important, even if the plaintiff had no such direct interest, the defendants may not 
raise the issue of standing in a rule 60(b) motion. Whether the facts of a given case meet the 
standard for exercising jurisdiction—here whether the plaintiff has standing—has been termed a 
‗quasi-jurisdictional‘ determination.‖ (quoting Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., 453 F.2d 645, 649 
(1st Cir. 1972))). 
 60. The Restatement acknowledges that the definition of jurisdiction is ―particularly difficult 
when the issue determining subject matter jurisdiction parallels an issue going to the merits‖ but the 
modern tendency ―is to reduce the vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground that the 
tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e 
(1982). It concludes: 
In all such situations, the matter in question can plausibly be characterized 
either as going to subject matter jurisdiction or as being one of merits or 
procedure. The line between the categories is not established through refinement 
of terminology but through the cumulation of categorizing decisions into a pattern. 
The establishment of pattern is complicated by the fact that the distinction between 
subject matter jurisdiction and merits or procedure has significance in contexts 
other than that concerning the vulnerability of a judgment to delayed attack. . . . 
Whatever the context, the underlying question is how far to go in the direction 
of policing the boundaries of a court‘s subject matter jurisdiction, when the cost of 
intensive policing is to enlarge the vulnerability of the proceeding to interruption 
through extraordinary writ or the like and to belated attack after it has gone to 
judgment. 
 
Id.; see Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010); Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 
909, 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2010); Clermont, supra note 16, at 1017–20; Howard M. Wasserman, 
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547–
52 (2008). 
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B.  Resequencing, or Using Hypothetical Jurisdiction to Produce a 
“Valid” Invalid Judgment 
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. represents another aspect of 
jurisdictional primacy that is different in operation from nonbypassability: 
it allows resequencing of nonmerits defenses.
61
 Ruhrgas held that a lower 
federal court could dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without first 
deciding subject-matter jurisdiction.
62
 Subsequent cases have expanded the 
resequencing exception. For example, although a court cannot bypass 
subject-matter jurisdiction in favor of a disposition on the merits, it can 
skip over subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss under forum non 
conveniens.
63
 Authorized to dismiss for a nonjurisdictional threshold 
defense, a court becomes freer to pursue judicial economy by deciding 
along an easier and surer path, as long as the outcome is the same party 
prevailing as if jurisdiction were denied.
64
 
To understand the effect of resequencing, one must consider some 
related doctrines, beginning with the doctrine of jurisdiction-to-determine-
jurisdiction. This doctrine relates to res judicata, and res judicata is where 
resequencing irresistibly takes us. There follows a general description as a 
means of orientation. 
1.  Jurisdiction-to-Determine-Jurisdiction 
The doctrine of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction treats ―a kind of 
question different from the normal application of res judicata: it does not 
involve preclusive use of determinations embedded in a valid judgment, 
but instead involves preclusive use of prior determinations [underlying a 
judgment] in order to establish [its] validity.‖65 That is to say, an 
affirmative ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, or 
adequate notice can foreclose relitigation of that prior determination and 
thus preclude the parties from attacking the resultant judgment by raising 
that ground in subsequent litigation.
66
 
It is true that if a defendant faces suit in a court that lacks jurisdiction or 
fails to give notice, the defendant ordinarily does not have to respond in 
any way. If the defendant takes no action of any kind in response to the 
suit, the court may enter a default judgment, but the judgment will be 
invalid. If the plaintiff should attempt to assert rights based on that 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co, 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999). 
 62. Id. at 583–88. 
 63. Sinochem Int‘l Co. v. Malay. Int‘l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) (dictum). 
 64. See Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
725, 742–46 (2009) (trying to characterize the doctrine as also serving as judicial restraint). 
 65. CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 4.4(B)(2), at 294. See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at 95–97 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing the doctrine 
of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction). 
 66. CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 5.1(A)(3). 
16
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judgment in a later suit involving the same defendant, the defendant 
ordinarily can avoid the effects of the judgment by showing that its entry 
was without jurisdiction or notice. The defendant has the right to a day in 
some court to question the authority of the court that rendered the earlier 
judgment.
67
 
Instead, the defendant may choose to raise the jurisdiction or notice 
issue in the initial action before the challenged court itself. Then, the court 
that otherwise lacks authority could conceivably have jurisdiction to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction and whether its notice was good, and 
its affirmative rulings on such questions could be binding on the defendant 
so as to preclude relitigation of the same questions. The defendant‘s 
appearance in the challenged court would then be the defendant‘s day in 
court on the question of the forum‘s authority. 
Our law, in fact, accepts this so-called bootstrap principle,
68
 and so 
allows a court lacking fundamental authority to issue a judgment that will 
nevertheless be immune from later attack.
69
 Because the essential issue of 
jurisdiction or notice was actually litigated and determined, even if 
erroneously, the defendant cannot relitigate the same issue in subsequent 
litigation. The defendant can obtain appellate review of the erroneous 
ruling, of course, but cannot challenge it upon seeking relief from 
judgment. Here, the desire for finality outweighs the concern for validity.
70
 
Indeed, our law accepts the bootstrap principle‘s value of finality with 
true enthusiasm, despite its conflict with the intuitive value of validity. Our 
law applies the principle even more broadly than the foregoing illustration 
of actually litigated and determined forum-authority defenses.
71
 Strangely, 
the most important extension comes in connection with subject-matter 
jurisdiction, in spite of the traditional lore about subject-matter 
jurisdiction‘s fundamental importance. On the one hand, as to 
unchallenged subject-matter jurisdiction in any action litigated to judgment 
by contesting parties, the implicit determination of the existence of subject-
matter jurisdiction has the preclusive consequences of an actually litigated 
determination, insofar as foreclosing attack on the judgment goes.
72
 On the 
other hand, sometimes the interests inherent in subject-matter jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 65–66 (1982). 
 68. See Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter 
Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 494–99 (1967). 
 69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 10–12 (1982). 
 70. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 116 (1963) (quasi in rem jurisdiction); Johnson v. 
Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 589 (1951) (jurisdiction over status); Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. 
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375 (1940) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Baldwin v. Iowa State 
Traveling Men‘s Ass‘n, 283 U.S. 522, 524–25 (1931) (personal jurisdiction). 
71. Indeed, upon a challenge to the existence of either territorial jurisdiction or adequate 
notice, an affirmative ruling precludes the defendant from attacking the resultant judgment on either 
ground in subsequent litigation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 10 cmt. d (1982). 
 72. See id. § 12 cmt. d; supra text accompanying note 51 (introducing the Chicot doctrine). 
17
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are just too important to ignore. Even an express finding of the existence of 
subject-matter jurisdiction will not preclude the parties from attacking the 
resultant judgment on that ground in special circumstances, such as where 
the court plainly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or where the judgment 
substantially infringes on the authority of another court or agency.
73
 
This doctrine of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction thus ends up 
being a bit peculiar. It constitutes a third body of res judicata law 
distinguishable from claim and issue preclusion, or perhaps a body of law 
standing separate from res judicata. It is obviously similar to issue 
preclusion, but it differs in several respects.
74
 The reason for the 
differences is that the policies that shape the doctrine of jurisdiction-to-
determine-jurisdiction are unique, and they produce a unique set of rules. 
For related reasons tied to the notion that the doctrine defines the judgment 
even more intimately than does usual res judicata, the federal common law 
of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction applies to a prior federal 
judgment.
75
  
2.  Jurisdiction-to-Determine-No-Jurisdiction 
―Passing beyond the [preclusive] effects of affirmative rulings on 
forum-authority, what if the initial court decides that it lacks jurisdiction or 
                                                                                                                     
 73. See, e.g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438–39 (1940) (holding that a state court 
proceeding could not preclude a bankruptcy proceeding); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 12 cmts. c, e (1982); Karen Nelson Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534, 560–
61 (1981). 
 74. See CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 5.1(A)(3). Issue preclusion differs in five respects: 
First, issue preclusion requires a valid prior judgment. Jurisdiction to determine 
jurisdiction does not require validity, but instead works to make invulnerable what 
could otherwise be an invalid judgment. Second, issue preclusion applies only in a 
subsequent action, and so does not apply on a motion for relief from judgment, 
which is technically a continuation of the initial action. Jurisdiction to determine 
jurisdiction, however, does apply to preclude a validity attack by such a motion, as 
well as by the other methods for relief from judgment. Third, issue preclusion 
usually does not work to bind the party prevailing on the issue. Jurisdiction to 
determine jurisdiction will preclude the successful plaintiff if the unsuccessful 
defendant would be precluded on the jurisdiction or notice issue. Fourth, issue 
preclusion applies only to issues actually litigated and determined. Jurisdiction to 
determine jurisdiction sometimes applies to issues of subject-matter jurisdiction 
that were not litigated at all, and even against a defaulting party. Fifth, and most 
importantly, special policies and concerns are at work with respect to the 
jurisdiction and notice defenses, so the law needs to develop special rules and 
exceptions for jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. 
Id. § 5.1(A)(3), at 307. 
 75. See Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 397–98 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(distinguishing Semtek). On the governing law for ordinary res judicata, see Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 502 (2001); Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal 
Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 535–44 (2003). 
18
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failed to give notice‖ and so dismisses?76 ―That is, can a court, which is 
admittedly without authority to enter a valid judgment, make any rulings 
that have preclusive effect?‖77 Yes, a doctrine of jurisdiction-to-determine-
no-jurisdiction exists.
78
 Courts and scholars have elaborated this doctrine 
less thoroughly than the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine, and 
thus its reach remains more controversial. 
A court should have authority to determine its own lack of authority. 
The initial court‘s ruling that it lacks authority should prevent a second try 
that presents exactly the same issue. One argument for giving it at least this 
minimal preclusive effect is that giving it no preclusive effect might raise 
the constitutional problem associated with advisory opinions.
79
 More to the 
point, common sense supports preclusion on the threshold issue in order to 
prevent a party—who chose a court that ruled against its own authority—
from litigating the same point repetitively. So, for such limited purpose, the 
prior judgment is a valid one. 
Naturally, there should be limits to the preclusive effects.
80
 After all, 
the court was supposed to be exercising only its jurisdiction for 
determining jurisdiction.
81
 The dismissal of the initial action on a 
jurisdictional defense does not generate a bar to a second action in an 
appropriate court that presents different jurisdictional issues.
82
 Further, the 
initial court‘s negative ruling on the jurisdictional issue should not have 
normal issue-preclusive effects in a later action and so should not preclude 
an issue on the merits of the same or any other claim.
83
 For such purposes, 
the prior judgment is an invalid one. Many good reasons support such 
limits, including the notions that limited jurisdiction should yield limited 
                                                                                                                     
 76. CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 4.4(B)(3), at 297. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and Jurisdictional 
Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 212–13 (2001) (addressing the preclusive effect 
of a federal court‘s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). 
 80. Id. at 206–22. 
 81. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 57–63. 
 82. See Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 (1866). 
 83. See Anusbigian v. Trugreen/Chemlawn, Inc., 72 F.3d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (―Thus, 
contrary to the plaintiff‘s fear, expressed in his brief, that he might be foreclosed from seeking 
damages in state court under the doctrines of res judicata or ‗law of the case,‘ the remand order 
forecloses nothing except further litigation of his claim in federal court.‖); United States v. Ritchie, 
15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994) (―[A]lthough Ritchie‘s clients were barred (after Judge Jarvis‘s 
ruling) from relitigating whether their motion to quash could be heard before the IRS brought an 
enforcement action, Judge Hull was not bound by any factual findings made by Judge Jarvis for the 
limited purpose of considering the jurisdictional challenge . . . .‖); By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry 
Co., 668 F.2d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1982) (―Armen-Berry can sue By-Prod and Schiff under Article 14 
of the Illinois Criminal Code in an Illinois court, and that court will not be bound by our reading of 
the Illinois law of punitive damages.‖). But see infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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effects
84
 and that the truncated procedure for deciding jurisdiction counsels 
against carrying jurisdictional determinations over to affect the merits.
85
 
The driving idea is that because the prior court lacked jurisdiction, it 
should be able to preclude little more than is absolutely necessary. 
Therefore, the basic rule is that the preclusive effect of jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction reaches no further than the precise issue of 
jurisdiction itself.
86
 It will defeat jurisdiction in any attempt to sue again in 
a second court where the same jurisdictional issue arises,
87
 even when one 
court is state and the other federal.
88
 But a finding of no jurisdiction does 
not produce a generally valid judgment and thus will not otherwise be 
binding in any other action. 
Going beyond these basics, a determination of no jurisdiction probably 
should not provide nonmutual preclusion, preventing a nonparty from 
basing preclusion on the prior determination.
89
 Nor should it work to 
establish, rather than defeat, the jurisdiction of the other court.
90
 For 
example, a finding that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction 
because of the nonexistence of some fact critical to exclusive jurisdiction 
should not force a state court to accept jurisdiction.
91
 Even though this 
                                                                                                                     
 84. See Edney, supra note 79, at 206–14. 
 85. See id. at 220–22. 
 86. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 29–30; Edney, supra note 79, at 217–18. It is true that 
Federal Practice and Procedure sounds more expansive in its explanation that ―[a]lthough a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar a second action as a matter of claim preclusion, it 
does preclude relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction question.‖ 18A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4436, at 154 (rev. ed. 2002). But, in fact, some of the specific discussion and the 
cases cited conform to the idea that preclusion extends only to ―the same issue of jurisdiction.‖ Id. 
at 150 n.3, 168. But see id. at 158 n.16 (Supp. 2010) (―‗Though a jurisdictional determination is not 
usually binding on future proceedings, it is binding as to issues that are addressed by the Court in 
determining the jurisdictional question.‘‖ (quoting Gavilan-Cuate v. Yetter, 276 F.3d 418, 420 (8th 
Cir. 2002))). 
 87. See, e.g., Coors Brewing Co. v. Méndez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2009), 
abrogated on other grounds, Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010); Hill v. 
Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1146–47 (7th Cir. 2003); Bromwell v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 208, 
212–13 (3d Cir. 1997); Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 88. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 1990) (―[T]he 
Louisiana courts would be bound by our ruling that defendants had insufficient contacts with 
Louisiana to satisfy the federal due process clause requisites for personal jurisdiction.‖); Eaton v. 
Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 1978) (―We must agree that the merits of the 
issue of personal jurisdiction over Volkswagen South was decided by the unappealed state court 
judgments and that they bar relitigation of the jurisdictional issue in the instant cases.‖). 
 89. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 86, § 4436, at 156, 171. 
 90. See R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 657 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979), 
abrogated on other grounds, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). But see Roth v. 
McAllister Bros., 316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963). 
91. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 647 (2006) (saying that ―[w]hile the 
state court cannot review the decision to remand in an appellate way, it is perfectly free to reject the 
remanding court‘s reasoning,‖ but basing the refusal to establish jurisdiction by preclusion on the 
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limitation on preclusion might lead to awkward situations,
92
 an extension 
of binding effect to the unempowered federal court‘s dismissal appears 
unnecessary and, hence, improper. Additional arguments for this limitation 
on preclusion might be (1) that the burden of proof for defeating 
jurisdiction is often lighter than the burden of proof for establishing 
jurisdiction, and issue preclusion does not apply when the burden 
increases,
93
 and (2) that establishing jurisdiction would usually work to the 
detriment of the defendant, and issue preclusion normally does not bind the 
victorious party.
94
 These additional arguments are not determinative, 
however, because the rules of jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction 
might be specially tailored and need not conform to those of issue 
preclusion.
95
 
The jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, however, is not 
in all respects narrower than issue preclusion. The law‘s capability to shape 
this special preclusion doctrine can broaden it. For example, by virtue of 
jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction, an unreviewable remand for lack 
of removal jurisdiction might preclude a subsequent federal action on the 
same cause,
96
 even though an inability to obtain appellate review usually 
defeats issue preclusion.
97
 
3.  Hypothetical Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Finally arriving at the workings of Ruhrgas, we find that most of the 
work is already done. The unchallenged and undecided issue of subject-
matter jurisdiction turns out to be entitled to the insulation from attack 
afforded by the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine, if the court 
acted as if subject-matter jurisdiction exists. A decided threshold defense 
turns out to be entitled to the preclusive effect afforded by the jurisdiction-
to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, if the court dismissed on that 
defense. 
Now, Ruhrgas‘s resequencing allows the court to ―hypothesize‖ the 
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction (including Article III justiciability) 
in order to dismiss on a threshold defense, even though someone has 
challenged subject-matter jurisdiction.
98
 As long as something has not gone 
                                                                                                                     
inability to obtain federal appellate review of the remand). 
 92. See Julie Fukes Stewart, Note, “Litigation Is Not Ping-Pong,” Except When It Is: 
Resolving the Westfall Act’s Circularity Problem, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1033–34 (2010) 
(describing cases that bounce between removal and remand). 
 93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982). 
 94. LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co., 865 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1988) (dictum) (―[A] 
finding which a party had no incentive (other than fear of collateral estoppel) to appeal, because he 
won, has no collateral estoppel effect.‖). 
 95. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 96. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 86, § 4436, at 155–56, 164. 
 97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982). 
 98. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583–88 (1999). 
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haywire, such as the prior court plainly lacking subject-matter jurisdiction 
or the prior judgment substantially infringing on the authority of another 
court or agency,
99
 this hypothetical jurisdiction will supply subject-matter 
jurisdiction to produce a valid judgment for the very limited purpose of 
jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction with respect to the ground for 
threshold dismissal. 
Admittedly, not everything about Ruhrgas follows without a wisp of 
oddity. By combining two purposefully restricted doctrines—the 
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine and the jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine—Ruhrgas expands them. Although it 
does not produce a generally valid and binding judgment, it produces a 
judgment that will defeat a second court‘s jurisdiction if the same 
jurisdictional issue arises there. That is to say, a judgment that decided that 
some facet of authority was lacking will have this preclusive effect—even 
though subject-matter jurisdiction might have been lacking, too. That is 
odd. Yet that oddity was precisely the intended effect of Ruhrgas‘s 
blessing of hypothetical jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the resulting doctrine is broader than the name ―jurisdiction-
to-determine-no-jurisdiction‖ implies. It extends beyond jurisdiction to 
quasi-jurisdictional decisions and other dismissals for lack of authority, 
including on venue and forum non conveniens grounds.
100
 For example, if 
a court faces defenses of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and of 
improper venue, it can skip over the former to give a decision that the 
venue was wrong, which will be binding on that narrow point thanks to 
hypothetical jurisdiction.
101
 Ruhrgas thereby yields a judgment valid for 
the very limited purpose of defeating jurisdiction, or authority more 
generally, in any attempt to sue again in a court where the same 
jurisdictional or authority issue arises.
102
 
                                                                                                                     
 99. See supra text accompanying note 73 (explaining that assumed-jurisdiction preclusion 
does not extend to every exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction). 
 100. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 86, § 4436, at 171–79. 
 101. Hypothetical jurisdiction supplies only subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, relief from the 
dismissal for improper venue should lie on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction or adequate 
notice. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that assumed-jurisdiction preclusion 
does not extend to territorial jurisdiction or notice). 
 102. Bear in mind that a valid judgment—one that can survive an attack for relief from 
judgment on fundamental grounds such as lack of jurisdiction or notice—enjoys normal res judicata 
effects. Thus, after denial of a forum-authority defense by a demonstrably valid judgment, the 
normal rules of res judicata apply. For example, if the question of a party‘s domicile is actually 
litigated and determined to uphold jurisdiction, and if that question of domicile arises as part of the 
merits of another claim, the prior finding could have issue-preclusive effect. For a quite different 
example, if a defendant loses a post-judgment attack made on the ground of inadequate notice, the 
loss will preclude further attacks on that ground, under the normal doctrine of issue preclusion. See, 
e.g., Arecibo Radio Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 825 F.2d 589, 590 (1st Cir. 1987). Therefore, if a federal 
court bypassed all threshold issues to dismiss for lack of venue, and a collateral attack on the 
judgment later failed because the second court found that the first court had jurisdiction and gave 
notice, the venue determination would be issue preclusive—without resort to the jurisdiction-to-
determine-jurisdiction doctrine, the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, or 
22
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One could counterargue that Ruhrgas‘s holding does not strictly require 
the existence of hypothetical jurisdiction. The idea would be that all the 
Ruhrgas Court did was allow dismissal for personal jurisdiction, thus 
getting the case out of the court but not necessarily giving the personal 
jurisdiction decision any binding effect. Yet no one takes that position.
103
 
The preclusion of hypothetical jurisdiction is necessary because otherwise 
the judgment will mean almost nothing. Additionally, there is the argument 
that preclusion on the threshold issue is required practically to prevent the 
plaintiff from suing repetitively. Finally, the system does not want to 
discourage the defendant from putting an array of threshold defenses 
before the court, which can then decide the optimal course of proceeding.  
In fact, those wary of overbroad preclusion counterargue that preclusion 
at the least should not broaden from intrasystem necessity to intersystem 
bindingness, so that the plaintiff who cannot sue again in federal court 
should be able to sue without preclusion in state court.
104
 This 
counterargument would be at its strongest when the federal court dismissed 
on the basis of state law and arguably was wrong as to the state law. The 
rejoinder here is that the parties and the Justices during oral argument in 
Ruhrgas certainly assumed that intersystem preclusion was at stake:
105
 as 
Justice Ginsburg declared, ―The Federal court would be accomplishing 
nothing [if it did not] bind the State court.‖106 The Court itself clearly 
envisaged intersystem preclusion: as Justice Ginsburg suggested in her 
opinion for the unanimous Court, ―If a federal court dismisses a removed 
case for want of personal jurisdiction, that determination may preclude the 
parties from relitigating the very same personal jurisdiction issue in state 
court.‖107 
Moreover, intersystem preclusion is implicit in Ruhrgas‘s holding, 
because allowing the Texas state court to reconsider either federal subject-
matter jurisdiction or the federal court‘s decision on personal jurisdiction 
would undercut the Court‘s decision. Reconsideration of subject-matter 
                                                                                                                     
hypothetical jurisdiction. 
 103. Even the earliest paper, which coined the term ―hypothetical jurisdiction,‖ concluded that 
the resulting judgment must have res judicata effect. Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction Arguendo: 
The Rationale and Limits of Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712, 730 n.110 (1979). 
 104. See Ely Todd Chayet, Comment, Hypothetical Jurisdiction and Interjurisdictional 
Preclusion: A “Comity” of Errors, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 99–101 (2000) (suggesting that a federal 
decision based on hypothetical jurisdiction should not preclude state courts); Edney, supra note  79, 
at 215 n.116, 218, 222 (arguing that there should be no such preclusion of personal jurisdiction in 
state court, not merely that there should be no preclusion if the state court were to find on collateral 
attack that federal subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking). 
 105. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 8–9, 13, 30–31, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 
U.S. 574 (1999) (No. 98-470). 
 106. Id. at 9; see supra text accompanying note 87. 
 107. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (citing Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men‘s Ass‘n, 283 U.S. 
522, 524–27 (1931), with the parenthetical to Baldwin that ―personal jurisdiction ruling has issue-
preclusive effect‖). 
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jurisdiction would forfeit the effort saved in skipping a tough question, and 
the reconsideration would come in a state court distant from and unfamiliar 
with the issue‘s intricacies. The state‘s reconsideration of personal 
jurisdiction would directly disregard the federal court‘s determination. 
Accordingly, under the federal res judicata law applicable to a federal 
judgment, the federal judgment in Ruhrgas‘s favor would preclude later 
suit in a Texas state court for lack of personal jurisdiction.
108
 
The counterarguments against preclusion will not prevail. In fact, the 
danger is that courts will give too much preclusive effect.
109
 That danger 
will only grow in the light of Justice Ginsburg‘s dicta: 
Issue preclusion in subsequent state-court litigation, 
however, may also attend a federal court‘s subject-matter 
determination. Ruhrgas hypothesizes, for example, a 
defendant who removes on diversity grounds a state-court suit 
seeking $50,000 in compensatory and $1 million in punitive 
damages for breach of contract. If the district court determines 
that state law does not allow punitive damages for breach of 
contract and therefore remands the removed action for failure 
to satisfy the amount in controversy, the federal court‘s 
conclusion will travel back with the case. Assuming a fair 
airing of the issue in federal court, that court‘s ruling on 
permissible state-law damages may bind the parties in state 
court, although it will set no precedent otherwise governing 
state-court adjudications. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. 
v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940) (―[Federal 
courts‘] determinations of [whether they have jurisdiction to 
entertain a case] may not be assailed collaterally.‖); 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12, p. 115 (1980) 
(―When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, 
the judgment [ordinarily] precludes the parties from litigating 
the question of the court‘s subject matter jurisdiction in 
subsequent litigation.‖).110 
Professor and attorney Charles Alan Wright offered this diversity 
hypothetical during his oral argument for the petitioner; Justice Ginsburg 
                                                                                                                     
 108. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 86, § 4436, at 168 & n.33; Idleman, supra note 20, at 
29; see also David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade: Some Thoughts About Her 
Contributions in the Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 30 (2004).  
 109. See, e.g., Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee‘s Int‘l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1206 
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an issue decided in a personal jurisdiction dismissal—―‗whether 
Applebee‘s assumed or represented that it would assume Casual Dining‘s purchase agreement with 
Matosantos‘‖—was preclusive on the merits in a second suit (quoting Matosantos Commercial 
Corp. v. Applebee‘s Int‘l, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (D. Kan. 1999), aff’d, 245 F.3d 1203 
(10th Cir. 2001))). 
 110. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585–86 (some citations omitted). 
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just swallowed this example whole.
111
 She provided completely irrelevant 
support in citing to Chicot and the Restatement, as both deal only with 
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction cutting off collateral attack and not 
with collateral estoppel.
112
 Not surprisingly then, her result, even if hedged, 
is wrong.
113
 
No reason exists to give decisions based on hypothetical jurisdiction 
more preclusive effect than what is appropriate under jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction.
114
 Again, the many good reasons for strictly 
limiting res judicata effects include the idea that limited jurisdiction should 
yield limited effects, especially when the court has skipped over decision 
on subject-matter jurisdiction. The truncated procedure for deciding forum-
authority issues counsels against carrying such determinations over to 
affect the merits.
115
 Therefore, the preclusive effect in this context should 
work only to defeat any attempt to relitigate in a second court where the 
same authority issue arises, thus not extending beyond the precise issue of 
authority that the first court decided.  
4.  Resequenceable Grounds 
The question remains: Which grounds for dismissal can leapfrog ahead 
of subject-matter jurisdiction? Resequencing, even of the merits (although 
presumably without the interplay of hypothetical jurisdiction), had become 
popular in the lower courts by the 1990s.
116
 That movement generated the 
reaction of the Supreme Court‘s Steel Co. case.117 But a certain amount of 
resequencing had in fact been popular even in the Supreme Court,
118
 as 
Steel Co. acknowledged.
119
 After Steel Co., the Supreme Court even 
expanded its list of resequenceable grounds.
120
 Meanwhile, the lower 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 
(1999) (No. 98-470). 
 112. See Moore, supra note 73, at 541–46. 
 113. See supra note 83 (collecting cases); Idleman, supra note 20, at 29–30 (arguing also that 
Ginsburg‘s example invokes law of the case rather than res judicata); Edney, supra note 79, at 201–
02.  
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 80–95. 
 115. See Edney, supra note 79, at 206–14, 220–22. 
 116. See, e.g., United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 474 (3d Cir. 1997) (calling hypothetical 
jurisdiction to reach the merits a ―settled principle‖). 
 117. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998). 
 118. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997) (treating class 
certification as resequenceable); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66–67 
(1997) (mootness); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 435 (1975) (abstention); Moor v. Cnty. of 
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716–17 (1973) (discretionary supplemental jurisdiction); Chandler v. 
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86–88 (1970) (exhaustion). 
 119. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 n.3. 
 120. Sinochem Int‘l Co. v. Malay. Int‘l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) (dictum) 
(treating forum non conveniens as resequenceable); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005) (applying 
Totten doctrine, which prohibits actions against the government based on covert espionage 
agreements); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (third-party standing); Elk Grove 
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courts resumed expanding that list too, to reach many relatively low-level 
inquiries.
121
 
―There is an array of non-merits questions‖ that federal courts may 
resequence today, as the District of Columbia Circuit summed up nicely 
once again.
122
 In Tenet v. Doe, the Supreme Court tried to generalize when 
it allowed resequencing of a ground ―designed not merely to defeat the 
asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry.‖123 
Then, in Sinochem, the Court more clearly drew the outer line as lying 
between ―nonmerits‖ and ―merits‖ grounds by explaining: ―Dismissal short 
of reaching the merits means that the court will not ‗proceed at all‘ to an 
adjudication of the cause. . . . The principle underlying these decisions was 
well stated by the Seventh Circuit: ‗[J]urisdiction is vital only if the court 
proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.‘‖124 Thus, ―when 
considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so 
warrant,‖125 a court can decide ―a threshold, nonmerits issue‖126 like forum 
non conveniens before subject-matter jurisdiction. But then, almost as if to 
demonstrate the lack of clarity of the Court‘s chosen dividing line, Justice 
Ginsburg qualified as to a conditional dismissal: ―We therefore need not 
decide whether a court conditioning a forum non conveniens dismissal on 
the waiver of jurisdictional or limitations defenses in the foreign forum 
must first determine its own authority to adjudicate the case.‖127 What 
Sinochem ultimately means, then, is that there is still plenty of room for 
arguing about the extent of the list of resequenceable grounds. 
Matters of sovereign immunity generate hot dispute in this respect.
128
 
                                                                                                                     
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2004) (prudential standing); Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (class certification, viewed as a matter of statutory standing); 
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1999) (personal jurisdiction).  
 121. See, e.g., In re LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2008) (transfer of venue); In 
re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255–56 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (forum non conveniens). 
 122. Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (treating federal 
sovereign immunity as resequenceable). 
 123. 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005) (dismissing on the basis of a rule prohibiting actions against the 
government based on covert espionage agreements). 
 124. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431 (quoting Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th 
Cir. 2006)). 
 125. Id. at 432. 
 126. Id. at 433. 
 127. Id. at 435. 
 128. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 81–89 (discussing both the Eleventh Amendment and 
federal sovereign immunity); cf. id. at 95–97 (discussing their bypassability); Hien Ngoc Nguyen, 
Comment, Under Construction: Fairness, Waiver, and Hypothetical Eleventh Amendment 
Jurisdiction, 93 CAL. L. REV. 587, 590–91 (2005) (discussing Eleventh Amendment immunity). The 
defense of domestic sovereign immunity is tricky because some see it in various contexts as 
jurisdictional, while others see it as quasi-jurisdictional. But the key question is whether a decision 
on such a ground will bar a new action, not some other question like whether the defendant can get 
relief from a default judgment on such a ground. Compare Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 
F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (treating federal sovereign immunity as resequenceable), with 
26
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Does the act-of-state defense come within the fold of threshold, nonmerits 
defenses?
129
 Is qualified immunity a resequenceable matter?
130
 One is 
tempted to say, at least, that defenses like res judicata or the statute of 
limitations are too much on the merits to resequence. But then one 
confronts the argument that even the merits should be resequenceable if the 
merits and jurisdiction intertwine.
131
 Where is the line, if one exists at all? 
One might think that no line will ever hold, that there is no logical 
stopping point in the expansion of the list of resequenceable grounds since 
the Steel Co. decision. But if the list were to expand into the merits, the 
Steel Co. rule would promptly unravel. We would be back where we 
started: a court could decide issues in any sequence, although the resulting 
judgment would be exposed to the normal avenues for relief from 
judgment, including collateral attack on subject-matter jurisdiction 
grounds. The nonbypassability rule would disappear, and hypothetical 
jurisdiction would no longer operate.
132
 
In other words, if Steel Co. calls for an ever-expanding list, then Steel 
Co. carries the seeds of its own destruction,
133
 much like the fate of other 
                                                                                                                     
Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998) (suggesting that subject matter-jurisdiction must 
come before an Eleventh Amendment immunity determination). 
Foreign sovereign immunity may be different because more people see it in more contexts as 
partly a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 66–72 (4th ed. 2007); cf. Kao Hwa 
Shipping Co. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910, 917–18 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (allowing relief 
from default judgment on the ground of foreign sovereign immunity). Thus, it could be 
nonbypassable and yet not resequenceable. 
 129. See Rutledge, supra note 5, at 44–46 (arguing that the law should change to bring the act-
of-state defense into the resequenceable group because not doing so gives settlement leverage to 
plaintiffs, increases judicial investment of resources, and retards development of legal glosses on 
the defense). 
 130. See ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL & DAVID R. STRAS, FEDERAL COURTS 540–
41 (2d ed. 2009) (posing the question for qualified immunity). 
 131. See Long Term Care Partners, LLC v. United States, 516 F.3d 225, 232–33 (4th Cir. 
2008); Joshua Schwartz, Note, Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a Broader “Arising Under” 
Jurisdictional Question, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2260 (2004) (arguing that dismissal for lack of 
a federal cause of action should be deemed quasi-jurisdictional and hence resequenceable). 
 132. See supra note 102 (explaining how validity works in the absence of hypothetical 
jurisdiction). Of course, the system could alternatively take the radical step of removing subject-
matter jurisdiction as a requirement for a valid judgment. See Moore, supra note 73, at 549, 562; 
Note, supra note 57, at 164–65, 222–23. 
 133. See Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 270–75; Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of 
Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1614, 1631 (2003) (arguing that ―there is no hard conceptual 
difference between jurisdiction and the merits‖ and ―when faced with the truly extraordinary case, 
the lower federal court judge knows that he or she can rule on the merits in the absence of 
jurisdiction‖); Viavant, supra note 44, at 571–72; cf. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 971 (2009) (detailing other difficulties of the ―jurisdiction‖ term); Jay Tidmarsh, 
Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 409–13 (2010) (detailing other 
difficulties of the ―merits‖ term). 
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sequencing rules.
134
 Therefore, a line must be drawn. As long as the Court 
wants to allow federal courts to purposefully skip subject-matter 
jurisdiction for easier and surer decisions with binding effect on certain 
threshold matters, it must not extend the permission to decisions on the 
merits. 
True, Chicot stands for the proposition that a court without subject-
matter jurisdiction can give a binding decision on the merits as long as the 
court thought it had subject-matter jurisdiction or the parties failed to raise 
an objection to subject-matter jurisdiction.
135
 But as Steel Co. necessarily 
said, a court cannot purposefully skip subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss 
on the merits.
136
 In that sense, the case‘s nonbypassability rule represents a 
limit on Chicot, just as it was the price for approving hypothetical 
jurisdiction.
137
 Moreover, Steel Co. was a rejection of the alternative route 
of allowing the court to dismiss on the merits but giving the decision no 
preclusive effect at all as to validity.
138
 In effect, Steel Co., as elaborated by 
Ruhrgas, was a compromise between those two views: making 
hypothetical jurisdiction too widely available in support of preclusion after 
the judge discretionarily sequences the defenses or prohibiting hypothetical 
jurisdiction altogether. 
Therein lies the key to understanding resequenceability. The 
compromise allows hypothetical jurisdiction only for disposition on 
nonmerits grounds, giving that decision the strictly circumscribed 
preclusive effect prescribed for the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-
jurisdiction doctrine. To get rid of the case at the threshold in a way that 
precludes only the threshold issue, allowing the plaintiff to correct the 
threshold defect in a second suit, is desirable. By contrast, there is no 
reason to allow exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction in a way that precludes 
the merits, especially in the possible absence of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Moreover, it would not be feasible to give a strictly circumscribed 
preclusive effect to a decision on the merits because if it gets any 
preclusive effect, it will kill the cause of action. 
The rule that emerges is not a compromise made only for the sake of 
compromise. It is a rule that makes defensible policy sense. Assuming one 
has decided that the first step down the Ruhrgas path is a sound step, the 
compromise gives the judge a reasonable zone of freedom of action at the 
threshold. Yet it tells the judge that to dispose of a claim in a preclusive 
way on the merits, the judge first has to make sure that the jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                     
 134. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 820–21 (2009) (undercutting the former 
sequencing rule of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001) (treating qualified immunity)). 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 51 & 72 (explaining the Chicot doctrine). 
 136. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 (1998). 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 51–59 (explaining the rationale of the 
nonbypassability list).  
 138. See supra text accompanying note 103 (explaining the unsatisfactoriness of this route).  
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ducks are in a row. Otherwise, hypothetical subject-matter jurisdiction will 
be unavailable to insulate the judgment from later attack. 
With the contours of that Steel Co.-Ruhrgas compromise finally 
exposed, the decisional grounds for which a court may purposefully skip 
over a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction become apparent. The length 
of the list should not turn on some abstract notion like ―essentiality‖ of the 
grounds to the judicial process.
139
 Instead, the law should draw the line in 
practical terms, by looking to when a court possibly lacking subject-matter 
jurisdiction should be able to give a binding decision on a defense. The 
court should not be able to bypass and dismiss when the effect is to kill the 
cause of action, but only when the plaintiff has a chance to avoid or correct 
the defect. The law already specifies when a plaintiff normally can start 
over after a contested dismissal. Accordingly, resequenceability should 
look to the line that res judicata already draws—with fair clarity—when it 
declines to create a bar to reassertion of the claim after an adjudication ―not 
on the merits.‖140 Thus, the list of resequenceable grounds should include 
only those defenses that could result in decisions not on the merits, in the 
claim-preclusive sense.
141
 
On the one hand, the settled Steel Co.-Ruhrgas line of precedent—
                                                                                                                     
 139. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 12–13, 74–75 (criticizing an essentiality test arguably 
suggested by Ruhrgas). 
 140. See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS 
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 98–99 (2001). As Professor Robert Casad and I explain: 
Certain dismissals not on the merits remain exceptions to the rule of bar, 
namely: (1) dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or territorial 
jurisdiction, improper venue, inadequate notice, or nonjoinder or misjoinder of 
parties; (2) most dismissals for prematurity of suit or failure to satisfy a 
precondition to suit; and (3) most voluntary dismissals. Moreover, unless 
prohibited by statute or rule, the court in the first action can specify that its 
dismissal is not to act as a bar; and the court in the second action will defer to that 
specification. 
Other dismissals and judgments, which are perhaps not in any real sense on 
the merits but which were preceded by an ample opportunity for the plaintiff to 
litigate the claim, have of late come within the rule of bar, at least in the view of 
many courts and legislatures. Examples include: (1) a dismissal for failure to state 
a claim; (2) a summary judgment, judgment on partial findings, or judgment as a 
matter of law and other decisions squarely on the merits; and (3) a dismissal for 
failure to prosecute or to obey a court order or rule, even though it is not in any 
real sense on the merits. 
Id. 
 141. A dismissal for failure to prosecute or to obey a court order or rule might have presented a 
special problem for this formulation had not the Court already solved it. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 
503 U.S. 131, 134, 139 (1992) (upholding imposition of FED. R. CIV. P. 11 sanctions even in a case 
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). Thus, a court can proceed directly to a 
disciplinary dismissal, which then will have normal claim-preclusive effects because subject-matter 
jurisdiction for discipline exists. 
29
Clermont: Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations fr
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
330 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
which lists justiciability, jurisdiction, abstention, exhaustion, class 
certification, and venue as resequenceable grounds—conforms to this test. 
Dispositions on such grounds do not create a bar to a new action when the 
plaintiff avoids or corrects the defect.
142
  
On the other hand, the disputed matters of sovereign immunity, act of 
state, and qualified immunity should not be resequenceable: to bypass 
subject-matter jurisdiction and give a preclusive decision on such a defense 
kills the cause of action on the merits, as opposed to merely deciding some 
threshold issue that normally does not create a bar.
143
 Likewise, the 
intuition that other defenses are not resequenceable seems sound: res 
judicata
144
 and even the statute of limitations
145
 are sufficiently on the 
merits in a claim-preclusive sense. Finally, the jurisdiction/merits divider 
persists in the law of claim preclusion: a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
is not treated as being on the merits, no matter how intertwined with the 
merits it might be, while a dismissal for failure to state a claim is now 
treated as being on the merits.
146
 Although there may be very good policy 
reasons to reach some of these issues early,
147
 there is no reason to extend 
hypothetical subject-matter jurisdiction to them. An important insight is 
that one should not compose the list with the policies of efficient 
sequencing in mind but instead with a focus on when we wish to extend a 
preclusive effect to the decided defense even in the possible absence of 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 
In sum, and as suggested at the outset, the list of resequenceable 
threshold matters is not the same as, and is in fact much longer than, the 
list of fundamental matters that a federal court cannot bypass. With the 
logic behind resequencing exposed, I am much more comfortable in 
specifying the two lists: 
 
Nonbypassable Defenses 
i.e., defenses the court 
cannot skip over to dismiss 
on the merits 
Resequenceable Defenses 
i.e., defenses on which the court can 
decide without first deciding 
nonbypassable defenses 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982). 
 143. See id. §§ 19–20. 
 144. See Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 138–40 (3d Cir. 1947); Bronstein v. 
Kalcheim, 467 N.E.2d 979, 982–83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
 145. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 140, at 93–96. 
 146. See supra note 60 (discussing the jurisdiction/merits divider in the similar, but not 
necessarily identical, context of validity). 
 147. See, e.g., supra note 129 (discussing act of state). 
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Article III justiciability;  
subject-matter jurisdiction 
other justiciability and jurisdiction; 
abstention; exhaustion; class 
certification; venue; anything else not 
on the merits in the claim-preclusive 
sense 
5.  Discretion to Resequence 
Once the court decides that an asserted defense is resequenceable, then 
the court must decide whether to decide it first. Normally, the court will 
still decide subject-matter jurisdiction first in light of Steel Co., but 
Ruhrgas frees the court to decide the other defense if that path is easier or 
surer, or if it serves other institutional interests.
148
 But that discretion is not 
my concern in this Part. Here, I am interested in a rule that forbids 
discretionary sequencing and, incidentally, how uncertainty about the 
scope of the rule might affect the court‘s exercise of that discretion. 
C.  Summary 
Today, upon a challenge to Article III justiciability or subject-matter 
jurisdiction, a federal court cannot avoid the challenge by dismissing on 
the merits, but the court may invoke hypothetical jurisdiction to sustain any 
nonmerits defense with preclusive effect as to that defense. In other words, 
the court should normally decide a defense of subject-matter jurisdiction at 
the outset of the case. Such a fundamental ground is nonbypassable. But if 
the defendant challenges the existence of some other threshold jurisdiction-
like requirement, the court has discretion to act as if it has subject-matter 
jurisdiction and decide on the basis of that other defect. Thus, relying on 
hypothetical jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court can resequence 
to render a binding determination on the lack of, say, personal jurisdiction 
or forum non conveniens. 
Nonbypassability has obvious sequencing implications for judicial 
decisionmaking because courts must decide in a certain order under that 
regime. It is indeed the law‘s foremost limitation on the courts‘ power to 
sequence. But upon close examination, the nonbypassability rule proves to 
be quite narrow, and the exception of resequenceability quite broad. Thus, 
this foremost sequencing limitation turns out not to be a major constraint, 
except perhaps as it lacks clarity. 
To the extent that courts are uncertain of the reach of the 
nonbypassability rule, but wish to avoid reversal, they will follow it even 
when it does not apply. Likewise, courts might be uncertain as to the list of 
resequenceable grounds or as to the workings of hypothetical jurisdiction. 
The result will be an unwillingness to avoid jurisdictional questions. 
                                                                                                                     
 148. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 14–20. 
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Steel Co.-Ruhrgas is a good doctrine when properly limited. To the 
extent that confusion creates a broader constraint, the constraint is 
undesirable. The above-given attention to the precise meaning of the 
doctrine reduced the current fog. Ideally, the doctrine should prove, in 
future actual practice, to be a fairly minimal constraint on courts‘ 
sequencing power. 
III.  INTRASUIT PRECLUSION 
A.  Jury-Judge Sequencing 
The middle of the last century saw a series of famous cases in which the 
Supreme Court reconciled the merger of law and equity with the Seventh 
Amendment and through which the Court greatly expanded the scope of 
the jury right.
149
 In the process, the Court created a sequencing rule under 
which a federal court
150
 must give first to the jury a factual issue common 
to the merits of a law claim and an equity claim joined in the same case. 
Given those special conditions, to say nothing of the rarity of trial,
151
 this 
rule has only occasional application. 
1.  Cases 
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover
152
 was the first of those cases. It 
involved a dispute between movie theaters over the exclusive right to show 
movies in the competitive area for a time period specified in a contractual 
―clearance.‖ In essence, Fox sued Beacon in equity for an injunction, and 
Beacon counterclaimed at law for treble damages under the antitrust laws. 
The two claims had a common issue concerning whether the Fox and 
Beacon theaters were in competition even though they were more than ten 
                                                                                                                     
 149. See generally RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS 
FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1495–527 (10th ed. 2010); 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302.1 (3d ed. 2008). 
 150. Although the Supreme Court has held most of the rights in the Bill of Rights to be 
fundamental enough for the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee against invasion by the states, the 
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury has not been one of those. See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 
U.S. 90, 92 (1876); Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (E.D. La. 1972), aff’d mem. 
sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973), and Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), 
and Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972). That is to say, the Seventh Amendment applies to actions 
in the federal courts, but not to state-court actions. But cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3035 n.13 (2010) (throwing the old cases into doubt and opening the door slightly to 
incorporating the Seventh Amendment). Moreover, the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the 
Seventh Amendment has had little persuasive influence on state courts. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 
149, at 1510–11. 
 151. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1956–
61 (2009) (showing that the trial rate has dropped nearly to 1% of filed federal cases). 
 152. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
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miles apart. Beacon wanted a jury trial.
153
 As a historical matter, an equity 
court had discretion whether to proceed in these circumstances or to defer 
to the later-commenced law action on the thought that the legal remedy 
was adequate.
154
 Accordingly, the district court chose to decide the equity 
claim first, without a jury, and the court of appeals assented.
155
 The 
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Hugo Black, reversed.
156
 
First, the Court‘s all-important premise was that whichever 
determination on the common issue of law and equity came first—be it by 
judge or by jury—would preclude the second determination.157 Here is that 
premise: 
Thus the effect of the action of the District Court could be, as 
the Court of Appeals believed, ―to limit the petitioner‘s 
opportunity fully to try to a jury every issue which has a 
bearing upon its treble damage suit,‖ for determination of the 
issue of clearances by the judge might ―operate either by way 
of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both 
parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble 
damage claim.‖158 
The Court, in fact, neglected to cite anything for this res judicata point. But 
as to preclusion between law and equity, the Court was right.
159
 Because 
the old courts administered law and equity in separate suits, preclusion still 
applied between them according to the ordinary rules of res judicata. 
Second, the Court reasoned that to circumvent preclusion, the trial 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 502–04. 
 154. See Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215–16 (1937); FIELD ET AL., supra note 
149, at 1493–95. 
 155. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 503–05. 
 156. Id. at 511. 
 157. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 334 (1979); David L. Shapiro & Daniel 
R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 442, 446 (1971). 
 158. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 504 (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 
864, 874 (9th Cir. 1958)). The Supreme Court was quoting the court of appeals, which actually had 
said,  
Petitioner is correct in saying that if this issue be first tried and determined by the 
court in its proposed first trial the determination of that issue by the court will 
operate either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both 
parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage claim. 
Beacon Theatres, 252 F.2d at 874. The court of appeals cited Bruckman v. Hollzer for this 
proposition but, nevertheless, held that the district judge could discretionarily try the equitable 
claim first. Id. at 874–75 (citing Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1946)). 
 159. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 334; Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 161 (1899); 
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 cmt. j (1942). Such preclusion prevailed not only in 1959 but 
also in 1791. See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 157, at 450–54. 
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judge could invoke his or her sequencing discretion.
160
 The judge should 
exercise such discretion in the light of current procedural realities—―not by 
precedents decided under discarded procedures, but in the light of the 
remedies now made available.‖161 In a merged system, the legal remedy, 
because it no longer required a separate action, had become an adequate 
remedy. Equity could await the trial of the common law claim. The judge 
could try the issue first to the jury without any disadvantage to the parties. 
Third, the Court ruled that preclusion of a jury by a prior determination 
in the same suit would normally violate the Seventh Amendment.
162
 
Therefore, the judge now must proceed in the order of jury decision on the 
common issue coming first. Note that the Court did not fashion a general 
principle that the jury must go first on common issues. Instead, it ruled that 
a court cannot choose to conduct a single suit in a way that would defeat 
the jury right. Accordingly, its holding applies only when intrasuit 
preclusion is actually in play. 
The Court‘s three-step reasoning is obscure to modern minds. It bears 
repeating that the Court saw its task as preserving the jury right in an 
altered procedural system. It thought that res judicata would apply in a 
single suit if, and only if, the parties would have brought separate suits in 
1791: in those circumstances, a prior jury determination would bind the 
judge, just as a prior judge determination would bind the jury. The Court 
manipulated history, without disregarding it, by finding equity to have 
possessed discretion in the old days and merely directing how modern 
chancellors should exercise it. The Seventh Amendment, because it 
favored the jury trial right over the judge trial right, requires modern courts 
to use their new procedural discretion in a way to avoid that preclusion of 
the jury. However, the Court did hedge a bit:  
If there should be cases where the availability of 
declaratory judgment or joinder in one suit of legal and 
equitable causes would not in all respects protect the plaintiff 
seeking equitable relief from irreparable harm while affording 
a jury trial in the legal cause, the trial court will necessarily 
have to use its discretion in deciding whether the legal or 
equitable cause should be tried first. Since the right to jury 
trial is a constitutional one, however, while no similar 
requirement protects trials by the court, that discretion is very 
narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to 
preserve jury trial. . . . This long-standing principle of equity 
dictates that only under the most imperative circumstances, 
circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the 
                                                                                                                     
 160. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510–11. 
 161. Id. at 507. 
 162. See id. at 510–11 (prohibiting that ―the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through 
prior determination‖). 
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Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a 
jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of 
equitable claims.
163
 
These hesitancies evaporated three years later when the Court, in 
another opinion written by Justice Black, decided Dairy Queen, Inc. v. 
Wood.
164
 In that case, the plaintiff had joined equitable and legal claims for 
relief. The defendant wanted a jury trial.
165
 As a historical matter, an equity 
court had no discretion as to the common issues, because the plaintiff 
could have denied the defendant a jury right on them by suing initially in 
equity only.
166
 Accordingly, the district court denied the request for a jury, 
and the court of appeals assented.
167
 But again, the Supreme Court 
reversed.
168
 
With a strong pro-jury bias, the Court simply lifted the bare holding of 
Beacon Theatres and applied it without regard to its context. The Dairy 
Queen Court said that ―in a case such as this where there cannot even be a 
contention of such ‗imperative circumstances,‘ Beacon Theatres requires 
that any legal issues for which a trial by jury is timely and properly 
demanded be submitted to a jury.‖169 It closed:  
We conclude therefore that the district judge erred in 
refusing to grant petitioner‘s demand for a trial by jury on the 
factual issues related to the question of whether there has been 
a breach of contract. Since these issues are common with 
those upon which respondents‘ claim to equitable relief is 
based, the legal claims involved in the action must be 
determined prior to any final court determination of 
respondents‘ equitable claims.170 
With Beacon Theatres cut free of its moorings in reason, virtually no 
subsequent cases have found imperative circumstances to avoid applying 
its rule.
171
 The rule applies without regard to historical restrictions or 
                                                                                                                     
 163. Id. at 510–11; see John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A 
Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1967). 
 164. 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962). 
 165. Id. at 475–76. 
 166. See generally FIELD ET AL., supra note 149, at 1490; FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. 
HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 515–20 (5th ed. 2001). 
 167. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 470. 
 168. Id. at 479–80. 
 169. Id. at 473. 
 170. Id. at 479. 
 171. See Cabinet Vision v. Cabnetware, 129 F.3d 595, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (―Accordingly, 
whatever discretion exists to override a jury‘s fact finding in such situations, this discretion is 
reviewed carefully.‖); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 149, § 2338, at 370 (concluding that it is 
―highly doubtful that there are any circumstances that would qualify‖). But see W. Geophysical Co. 
of Am. v. Bolt Assocs., Inc., 440 F.2d 765, 772 (2d Cir. 1971); Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. Lussi, 
42 F.R.D. 27, 32 (N.D.N.Y. 1967). 
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current circumstances. Even if the trial court dismisses the legal claim for 
relief joined by the plaintiff with an equitable claim for relief, and then the 
court tries the equitable claim without the jury requested by the plaintiff, 
the same rule applies: when the appellate court finds the dismissal to have 
been in error, the trial court must retry the common issues to a jury first.
172
 
2.  Consequences 
As one consequence, today the strict sequencing rule is that a federal 
court must, upon request for a jury, first try to the jury any issue common 
to joined legal and equitable claims for relief.
173
 The joinder might be by 
the plaintiff joining multiple claims for relief, or it might result from the 
defendant asserting a defense or counterclaim that, in the old days, could 
have stood as a separate claim. As another consequence, a preclusion rule 
provides that the jury‘s decision will bind the judge on the common 
issue.
174
 
Where does this preclusion rule come from? It does not come from res 
judicata, which, as all the hornbooks say,
175
 applies only between separate 
suits.
176
 It rests solely on the Seventh Amendment‘s historical approach:177 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 551–54 (1990). 
 173. See Shum v. Intel Corp., 499 F.3d 1272, 1276–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007); LARRY L. TEPLY & 
RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 886–87 (3d ed. 2004); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 149, 
§§ 2305, at 125 & n.21, 2338, at 368 & n.10. 
 174. Int‘l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Can., Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 735, 738 n.1 (7th Cir. 
2004); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc. 138 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir.) (―[T]he jury‘s finding on an issue 
common to both claims is in any event conclusive . . . .‖), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802, 
802 (1998); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass‘n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (―As our sister 
circuits have uniformly held in cases involving allegations of intentional discrimination, the district 
court must therefore follow the jury‘s factual findings with respect to a plaintiff‘s legal claims when 
later ruling on claims for equitable relief.‖), modified on reh’g, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 
vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999); JAMES ET AL., supra note 166, at 528. 
 175. See, e.g., CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 140, at 7–8; JAMES ET AL., supra note 166, at 
677; TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 173, at 944–45; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 1 (1982). 
 176. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 149, at 688. 
The doctrine of res judicata specifies certain binding effects, in subsequent 
litigation, of a previously rendered judgment. Generally speaking, then, res 
judicata can apply only when an attempt is made in a second action to foreclose 
relitigation of a matter already adjudicated in a previous action. Res judicata 
therefore has no application to an attempt in the original action at correcting error 
in the judgment, as by motion for a new trial or by appeal. 
Id. 
 177. Such preclusion outside the traditional confines of res judicata is not unique. Another 
special kind of preclusion can apply within the same suit: jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction 
applies to preclude a direct attack on validity by a motion for relief from judgment. See, e.g., 
Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 64–66 (2d Cir. 1986) (involving FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)). The 
special doctrine of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction springs from sources different from those 
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because in 1791 the legal and equitable claims would have been separate 
suits, we should apply intrasuit preclusion between jury and judge in order 
to preserve the jury right as it was. Therefore, being an aspect of jury right, 
and not part of res judicata, this special kind of jury-judge preclusion has 
no broader application than factual issues common to joined legal and 
equitable claims. 
Where does that sequencing rule come from? It follows from the 
Seventh Amendment‘s special preclusion rule, aimed at protecting the jury 
right. Therefore, it too has no broader application than factual issues 
common to joined legal and equitable claims. 
Of course, one could say that the jury precedents will come to apply 
without any regard to their reasoning, much as Dairy Queen extended 
Beacon Theatres. But that outcome is unlikely now that the jury mania of 
the 1960s has passed.
178
 Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen was a product of its 
time, and now the Court would probably not adopt it as a matter of first 
impression. We accordingly need to excavate the Court‘s train of reasoning 
and respect the restraints inherent therein.  
The restrained view of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen helps to explain 
the Court‘s later decision in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.179 In that case, 
the Supreme Court held that a prior equitable decree could preclude the 
defendant in a subsequent law action brought by a new plaintiff.
180
 On the 
one hand, this result is consistent with the law of res judicata, which allows 
equity-law preclusion.
181
 It is indeed consistent with the view that res 
judicata adjusts to any procedural changes and so an expanded notion of 
res judicata can apply in new situations despite old procedural limitations. 
Just as merged procedure caused claim preclusion to extend to a plaintiff 
who sues on either the legal or the equitable part of a claim without the 
other part,
182
 nonmutual collateral estoppel could leap the equity/law 
divide to defeat a defendant‘s jury right in an action by a new plaintiff. On 
                                                                                                                     
of claim and issue preclusion. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 Other preclusion-related rules might stem from the Seventh Amendment. Some courts have 
posited that in a bifurcated trial, the second jury cannot reconsider the first jury‘s finding without 
violating the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco 
Co., 84 F.3d 734, 751 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302–
03 (7th Cir. 1995)); Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in Federal Class 
Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 285, 307–08 (2010); cf. 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 1801, at 
272–73 (discussing the analogous partial-certification problem). But see Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. 
Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969, 
975, 1019–28 (2010). These courts further conclude that to protect the jury right in the second 
phase, the issues in the two phases need to be distinct and separable. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 
Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 320 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 178. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 149, at 1525–27. 
 179. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 180. See id. at 335. 
 181. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. i (1982). 
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the other hand, the result is also consistent with the jury-judge sequencing 
rule. Because that rule rests on the Seventh Amendment‘s dictate that in a 
single suit the judge must use existing sequencing power to preserve the 
jury right, it has no application to the Parklane situation of separate 
lawsuits for which sequencing is not a possibility.
183
 The Supreme Court 
could have invented a wholly new rule of res judicata that provided for no 
preclusion at the expense of the jury right in any setting whatsoever, but 
the pro-jury motivation to invent had waned. 
This view of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen is not only restrained but 
also subtle. Lower courts can misunderstand it and, at least within a single 
suit, think that the jury-judge sequencing rule applies more broadly than it 
should. 
The prime example of confusion involves issues common both to 
jurisdiction and to the merits. Although there is no constitutional jury right 
on jurisdictional issues,
184
 courts and commentators equivocate on whether 
a jury must first determine any common issue.
185
 But they are wrong to 
equivocate. Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen applies only to issues common 
to joined legal and equitable claims, not to issues common to jurisdiction 
and the merits. The reason is that the preclusion premise of Beacon 
Theatres-Dairy Queen rested on preclusion between separate law and 
equity suits. Preclusion never extended to decisions on jurisdiction that 
foreclosed later consideration of the merits in the same suit.
186
 Because 
there would be no preclusion, there is no need to invert matters by a 
sequence that would have the jury consider the merits before the judge 
could decide the common issue involved in the dispute over jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the judge can decide jurisdiction at the outset, and the jury can 
decide anew the common issue at the regular trial. 
B.  Foreclosure 
Concern about preclusion in violation of the Seventh Amendment 
generated Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen. But as shown above, its 
                                                                                                                     
 183. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 550–54 (1990). 
 184. See Steven Kessler, Note, The Right to a Jury Trial for Jurisdictional Issues, 6 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 149, 149 (1984); Note, Trial by Jury of Preliminary Jurisdictional Facts in Federal Courts, 
48 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1963) (arguing that jurisdiction is an issue collateral to the merits and so no 
jury right exists); cf. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2003) (―[T]he decision to label an issue ‗law‘ or ‗fact‘ is a functional 
one based on who should decide it under what standard, and is not based on the nature of the 
issue.‖). 
 185. See, e.g., Friedman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 181 F. Supp. 327, 329 (W.D. Pa. 
1960) (saying there is a jury right ―where the jurisdictional question of joint venture is closely tied 
to the merits‖); Kessler, supra note 184, at 165–66; Note, supra note 184, at 480–81, 489. 
 186. Some statutes expressly so provide. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-301(b) (2005); 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(2); cf. Clermont, supra note 16, at 990–91 (arguing additionally against 
preclusion because the standard of proof for jurisdiction is less demanding than the standard 
applicable to the merits). 
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sequencing rule does not extend beyond the narrow context of factual 
issues common to joined legal and equitable claims. The question now 
becomes whether other concerns about foreclosure later in the same suit 
have generated sequencing rules applicable in other contexts.  
1.  Res Judicata 
Here the answer is fairly simple. No further sequencing rules arise from 
concerns about actual preclusion in the same suit because there is no 
intrasuit res judicata (as opposed to some separate doctrine such as Beacon 
Theatres-Dairy Queen).
187
 
The cases conform to that view. Besides jurisdiction, judges must 
decide other preliminary matters that overlap matters destined later to go 
before the ultimate decisionmaker. For example, some evidentiary rulings 
involve issues common with the merits: 
Consider the co[-]conspirator exception to the hearsay rule as 
it operates in a criminal conspiracy case. To establish that a 
hearsay exception applies, the proponent of evidence must, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, show that the prerequisites 
for the exception have been established. . . . But if the 
substantive charge is conspiracy, that means that the court 
must in effect find that defendant is guilty of conspiracy (by a 
preponderance of the evidence) before admitting this 
evidence, which the jury must evaluate, along with all the 
other evidence, in determining whether defendant has been 
proved guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
judge does not, of course, tell the jury that she has already 
concluded that defendant is guilty, albeit only by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and defendant‘s right to a jury 
trial is preserved.
188
 
Therefore, no corrective sequencing rule for evidentiary rulings is 
necessary. 
In one of the more exotic rulings, Pavey v. Conley, the Seventh Circuit 
faced a situation in which the same factual issue, the severity of injury, was 
germane both to the preliminary inquiry of whether the prisoner had 
exhausted his administrative remedies and to the merits of the case.
189
 The 
district court had held that the prisoner possessed a jury trial right on any 
factual issues relating to whether he had exhausted the administrative 
remedies, and so it had delayed determination of the defense until trial. The 
court of appeals ruled that the judge should decide on exhaustion and do so 
at the outset, but the ultimate factfinder could revisit the judge‘s 
determination. The court reasoned that, ―if there is a jury trial, the jury will 
                                                                                                                     
 187. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 188. Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits 
on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 365–66 (2011). 
 189. 544 F.3d 739, 740–41 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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make all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even 
informed of) any of the findings made by the district judge in determining 
that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies.‖190 
The most common setting in which courts overtly discuss this problem 
is class certification. By now it should be clear how the Hydrogen Peroxide 
case could say: ―Although the district court‘s findings for the purpose of 
class certification are conclusive on that topic, they do not bind the fact-
finder on the merits.‖191 All the cases on this point seem to say the same on 
preclusion.
192
 
Against all the case law, one could argue that because class actions 
were equitable in origin, and only equity could entertain a class action even 
when its merits were all legal,
193
 we have fallen back into the context of 
issues common to joined legal and equitable claims.
194
 But the class-action 
situation is different from joinder of legal and equitable claims. Although 
class actions were originally all equitable, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
the jury right will be determined separately for certification and for the 
merits: the former remains equitable, with decision by the judge, while the 
latter might be ―legal,‖ with a jury right.195 The certification and the merits 
nonetheless have always been part of one case, not to be pursued in 
separate law and equity suits, and hence with no room for the application 
of res judicata between the class action‘s equitable and legal parts. With 
the Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen premise of preclusion therefore not 
kicking in, there is no sequencing conclusion. The court can decide the 
certification issues first, and the ultimate factfinder, be it judge or jury, will 
be free to reconsider any common issues. 
Alternatively, opponents of the case law on class certification could 
argue that the denial of preclusion is inefficient or even unfair. The idea is 
that the court should not have to try the same question twice, and the 
victorious party should not have to undergo that expense and risk. 
Moreover, retrying an issue creates the risk of inconsistent determinations, 
which can be thorny when emanating from the same suit. The difficulty 
                                                                                                                     
 190. Id. at 742. 
 191. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 192. See id. at 318 n.19 (citing cases); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 
(2d Cir. 2006) (―[D]etermination as to a Rule 23 requirement is made only for purposes of class 
certification and is not binding on the trier of facts, even if that trier is the class certification judge.‖ 
(citing Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004))), clarified, 483 F.3d 70 
(2d Cir. 2007); Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005); Gariety v. Grant 
Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.06(b) (2010); Marcus, supra note 188; Olson, supra note 3, at 964–65. 
 193. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 149, at 1493. 
 194. See Davis & Cramer, supra note 177, at 1011–12 (arguing that a certification ruling 
would preclude the jury and so violate the Seventh Amendment); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. 
Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities 
Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 357–60 (2010) (same). 
 195. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540–41 (1970); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, 
§ 1801. 
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this argument runs into, aside from any potential Seventh Amendment 
concerns, is once again that there simply is no doctrine of intrasuit res 
judicata to do the work. If one wants to pursue such policies relating to 
efficiency and fairness, the most promising route involves resorting to the 
already applicable doctrine called law of the case.
196
  
2.  Law of the Case 
A doctrine that bears some resemblance both to res judicata and to stare 
decisis is the law-of-the-case doctrine.
197
 Despite its name, it now can 
apply to rulings on fact as well as on law. It is similar to stare decisis
198
 in 
that it applies rather flexibly, so that a court may revisit the ruling if 
convinced there is good reason to do so. It is similar to res judicata in that 
it applies narrowly, albeit in a different range. It does not apply beyond the 
parties to the case in which the ruling was rendered.
199
 Indeed, the ruling 
can be binding as the law of the case only during the later conduct of the 
very case in which the ruling was made, that is, within the context of the 
initial action.
200
 It will not bind the parties, or anyone else, in later 
proceedings that are not part of the same case. 
Basically, the law-of-the-case doctrine means that a question once 
actually resolved in the course of litigation will not lightly be reconsidered 
at later stages in the same action, except by a higher court, even if the point 
was erroneously decided: 
Within a single lawsuit the general principles mentioned 
[in connection with stare decisis and res judicata]—desire for 
consistency, desire to terminate litigation, desire to maintain 
the prestige of courts—have some meaning. There is a feeling 
that the various phases of a lawsuit should be consistent one 
with another; that the same matter should not be the subject of 
repetitious, time-consuming hearings; that public confidence 
must be preserved in the judicial system by adhering to a 
decision once made. These attitudes have been reflected in 
numerous cases which have involved the ―law of the case‖ 
                                                                                                                     
 196. Other, less feasible routes include eliminating the overlapping threshold questions or 
postponing them until trial. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action 
Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 55–59 (2004) (criticizing such ―strong-form rules‖). 
 197. See generally 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4478–4478.6 (2d ed. 2002) (stressing the great development 
of the doctrine of law of the case in recent times); cf. Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit 
Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 1 (presenting an older and somewhat narrower view). 
 198. See generally Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 411 (2010) (examining stare decisis as applied by the Supreme Court). 
 199. See 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 197, § 4478.5, at 809–14. 
 200. See id. § 4478, at 637–45. 
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doctrine.
201
 
This does not mean, of course, that the parties may not directly 
challenge rulings by regular procedures, such as by appeal or by motion for 
rehearing en banc. But if the ruling has withstood such direct challenges, as 
for instance when a case has been appealed and remanded, or if the direct 
challenge that might have been made was not, the ruling is said to have 
become the law of that particular case and is ordinarily not subject to 
reexamination. 
There are many exceptions to the application of the rule of law of the 
case. One may well question whether the interests of judicial economy 
served by the doctrine are generally of such importance as to justify 
holding parties to erroneous rulings that could still be corrected within the 
framework of the same case. In view of the lesser justification of the law-
of-the-case doctrine, it is not surprising that courts have not applied it with 
as much rigor and consistency as they have shown in connection with res 
judicata. The doctrine, ―as applied to the effect of previous orders on the 
later action of the court rendering them in the same case, merely expresses 
the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, 
not a limit to their power.‖202 
In summary, the law-of-the-case doctrine, intended to foster judicial 
economy, provides that a court (and any coordinate or lower courts as well) 
will normally adhere to a ruling it has declared in a particular action when 
a party later raises the point again in the same action. But this doctrine 
applies very flexibly, so that the rendering court and coordinate courts can 
revisit the ruling if convinced it was wrong or some other reason counsels 
reconsideration. If so interpreted as mere maxims that a court will not 
lightly redo what has been done and that lower courts must obey higher 
courts, then the law-of-the-case doctrine expresses only the common sense 
of ―protecting against the agitation of settled issues‖203 or ―disciplined self-
consistency,‖204 and does some good and little harm. 
Consider one last time the Hydrogen Peroxide setting of class 
certification. As to the good the law-of-the-case doctrine accomplishes in 
that setting, it says that any common issue‘s first determination will 
normally stand, obviating the need for reconsideration. This normal 
application will work to retrieve the efficiency and fairness that 
reconsideration otherwise would put at risk. 
The doctrine‘s constraint, however, is never really confining. 
Accordingly, it will not always apply. In fact, the Seventh Amendment as 
                                                                                                                     
 201. Vestal, supra note 197, at 1. 
 202. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). 
 203. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988) (quoting 1B 
JAMES WM. MOORE, JO DESHA LUCAS & THOMAS S. CURRIER, MOORE‘S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
¶ 0.404[1], at 118 (2d ed. 1984)). 
 204. 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 197, § 4478, at 636. 
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interpreted in Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen dictates allowing the jury to 
reconsider any issue on which a constitutional jury trial right exists.
205
 
More generally, the court retains the power to reconsider. Because of this 
flexibility, the doctrine necessitates no sequencing rules. But because the 
flexibility of the doctrine allows for reconsideration sometimes, it also 
creates the risk of inconsistent decisions. That is the harm the doctrine 
imposes. 
What should be done when a later determination contradicts an earlier 
determination?
206
 Except where the adjudicator has newly found 
jurisdiction to be lacking,
207
 the judge need not go back and correct the 
earlier decision, unless the judge thinks that undoing the earlier decision is 
desirable. But clearly it would be best to minimize the occasion for 
inconsistency, as by regularly relying on the law-of-the-case doctrine. An 
alternative would be to rationalize away the inconsistency by construing 
the ―common‖ issues to be different after all or to be governed by different 
standards or burdens of proof.
208
 
C.  Summary 
Upon trial of a factual issue common to the merits of both law and 
equity claims for relief joined in the same case, a federal court must give 
the issue first to the jury for decision. The verdict will bind the judge with 
respect to the equitable claim. These two consequences derive from the 
Seventh Amendment. 
Thus, this sequencing rule has a very limited range of application. 
Although it applies if a case for, say, injunction and damages happens to 
reach trial, it does not reach the situation of a judge deciding a threshold 
issue like jurisdiction, class certification, or evidentiary admissibility. The 
reason is that in these latter situations, there will be no intrasuit preclusion 
and hence no requirement to go first to the jury. 
Once again, however, the courts suffer from uncertainty about the reach 
of this sequencing rule. Accordingly, they defer overly to fears of intruding 
on the jury right. Efforts herein to dissipate the fog should pay dividends in 
establishing the narrow limits of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen on courts‘ 
sequencing power: 
 
                                                                                                                     
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 163 & 170. 
 206. The question of which determination will have res judicata effect is not quite so difficult. 
It would probably be the later one, either by operation of the essential-to-judgment requirement or 
perhaps by analogy to the last-in-time rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 15, 27 
cmts. h, m (1982). 
 207. See, e.g., H.V. Allen Co. v. Quip-Matic, Inc., 266 S.E.2d 768, 769 (N.C. Ct. App.) 
(reversing defendant‘s victory on the merits, while ordering dismissal for lack of long-arm 
jurisdiction because defendant had made no contract), appeal dismissed, 273 S.E.2d 298, 298 (N.C. 
1980). 
 208. See generally Clermont, supra note 16, at 978–1000 (establishing that the standard of 
proof for jurisdiction is less demanding than the standard applicable to the merits). 
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Sequencing and Preclusion Law of the Case 
in a case of joinder of legal and 
equitable claims for relief, the 
common factual issues go first to 
the jury and then the verdict binds 
the judge, both rules being by 
virtue of the Seventh Amendment 
for all other intrasuit common 
issues, there is no sequencing 
rule, but then there is neither 
foreclosure of the jury nor any 
other foreclosure beyond the 
flexible law-of-the-case 
doctrine 
CONCLUSION 
Courts in federal civil cases can sequence their decision of multiple 
issues as they wish, except for the narrow Steel Co.-Ruhrgas and Beacon 
Theatres-Dairy Queen rules. The former rule generally requires a federal 
court to decide Article III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction 
before ruling on the merits. The latter rule requires a federal trial judge to 
give first to the jury a factual issue common to the merits of a law claim for 
relief and an equity claim for relief joined in the same case. 
In conjunction with sequencing, some special preclusion will result. On 
the one hand, Article III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction will 
most often enjoy preclusive effect in a subsequent suit, under the 
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine for affirmative decisions or 
the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine for negative 
decisions, or by virtue of hypothetical jurisdiction for purposefully skipped 
decisions. On the other hand, upon repetitive encounter of overlapping 
matters in the same suit, the decisionmaker can reconsider its decision 
without any intrasuit preclusion, except for the jury‘s Seventh Amendment 
preclusion of the judge and except for the flexible restraint of the law-of-
the-case doctrine. 
In the end, judges‘ broad power to sequence is probably desirable. At 
the least, the narrow scope of the few limits on that power, as well as the 
complexity and dissimilarity of those limits, stands as a challenge to any 
limit‘s justification. 
44
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss2/1
